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The Right to Medicaid Payment
For Abortion
By PATRICIA A. BUTLER*
The issue of Medicaid funding for abortion is one which has
aroused continuing debate, both in state legislatures and in Congress.
On one hand are those who oppose use of federal or state funds to
secure abortions. They argue that abortion is morally *rong and that
providing Medicaid payment for the procedure implicates the govern-
ment in the taking of human life. On the other hand, proponents of
legal abortion point out that antiabortion laws are a relatively recent
development. Under the common law, abortions were generally legal; it
was not until the early nineteenth century that laws were passed prohib-
iting the procedure.' Thus, supporters of the right to abortion urge that
the moral argument is misplaced and that notions of morality change
with the times. Women, they insist, have a constitutionally protected
right to choose to undergo an abortion; therefore the government cannot
restrict the ability of poor women to obtain abortions by refusing to
provide them with Medicaid funds. It was hoped that a definitive
statement on the issue would be made by the Supreme Court when it
agreed to hear three Medicaid abortion cases in its October 1976 term.2
The question was later complicated, however, by congressional enact-
ment of an antiabortion amendment to the 1977 appropriations bill for
the HEW and Labor departments.
3
The Court first stepped into the abortion controversy in 1973 when
it decided Roe v. Wade4 and Doe v. Bolton,5 the now famous compan-
ion cases challenging restrictive state abortion laws. Roe v. Wade
involved Texas statutes which made it illegal to perform an abortion
* A.B., 1966, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1969, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley. Member, California Bar.
1. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-47 (1973).
2. See notes 24-26 & accompanying text infra.
3. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434.
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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unless it was necessary to save the mother's life. Doe v. Bolton chal-
lenged Georgia statutes which limited the availability of abortions by
requiring that: (1) the attending physician obtain the concurrence of
two other physicians that the procedure was necessary; (2) a hospital
committee make such a finding; (3) the abortion be performed in an
accredited hospital; and (4) the patient be a Georgia resident.
In its opinions in Wade and Bolton, the Court determined that the
decision to abort pregnancy is encompassed in the constitutionally pro-
tected right of privacy, as it involves intimate personal rights surround-
ing family planning and marriage. 6 Thus, the Court found in Wade
that the right of a woman to choose abortion in consultation with her
physician is one of the "personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamen-
tal.' "-7 Consequently, a statute infringing upon the right to abortion will
be invalidated unless the state can demonstrate a compelling interest in
such infringement. 8 In light of the health risks of the abortion proce-
dure, the Court ruled that the right to choose abortion is not absolute
but is qualified according to the stage of pregnancy. With respect to the
first trimester of pregnancy, the Court held that, because of the minimal
risks abortion poses to the patient's health, the state has no interest
whatsoever in regulating the patient-physician decision. The state's
interest in the woman's health does arise, however, during the second
stage of pregnancy, 9 at which time the state is justified in imposing some
conditions upon abortion services to the extent that such conditions
reasonably relate to the preservation and protection of maternal health.1"
The Court held in Bolton, however, that conditions such as hospital
accreditation and concurrence by hospital review committees or other
physicians were invalid since they did not advance maternal health, were
not imposed upon performance of other similar procedures, and thus
were not supported by a compelling state interest. 1'
The Court in Wade reasoned that only later, at the point of
potential fetal viability outside the womb, does the state possess a
sufficient interest in the life of the fetus to allow placing restrictions on
the performance of abortion. 2 The Court did not expressly designate
6. The Court noted that the privacy right has been extended to activities relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and edu-
cation. 410 U.S. at 152-53.
7. Id. at 152.
8. Id. at 155.
9. Id. at 163.
10. Id.
11. 410 U.S. at 198-99.
12. 410 U.S. at 163-64.
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the point at which this compelling state interest in fetal life begins. It is
generally considered by the medical profession to arise at the com-
mencement of the third trimester of pregnancy, although there is some
debate about the actual time after which a fetus can survive alone.
Future advances in medical science may make it possible to sustain the
fetus outside the womb at an earlier point. Apparently recognizing this
potential for technological advances as well as the differing points of
viability among fetuses, the Court recently refused to invalidate a state
law which defined viability as that stage "when the life of the unborn
child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or
artificial life-supportive systems."13
However imprecise may be the exact time at which the state may
legitimately take an interest in fetal life, it is clear that during the first
trimester of pregnancy the state cannot impose any barriers to abortion
when it is chosen by a woman in consultation with her physician. For
some period thereafter, the state may not forbid abortions but may
regulate the procedure in the interest of preserving and protecting
maternal health.
The Wade and Bolton rulings left several questions unanswered.
May a state statute demand spousal or parental consent as a prerequisite
to abortion? Must all public hospitals allow their facilities to be used
for abortions?'- Are states obligated to pay for abortions for women
13. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2838 (1976). For purposes
of payment for abortions under Medicaid, California has set viability at twenty weeks.
California Dep't of Health, Medi-Cal Bull. No. 52A, at 2, Mar. 1976. This adminis-
trative action flies in the face of the Supreme Court's express holding in Danforth that
viability is a medical concept that courts and legislatures may not define. 96 S. Ct. at
2838. See also Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1975). In Hodgson,
the court invalidated a Minnesota statute prohibiting abortions after twenty weeks. Id.
at 1016.
The medical literature still supports the Court's contention in Wade that viability
cannot occur before twenty-four weeks, and probably not until twenty-eight weeks. See,
e.g., AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTEnuCs AND GYN., MANUAL OF STANDARDS IN OBSTE:
Tmc-GYNECOLOGIC PRACTICE 108 (2d ed. 1965); E. WILLIAMS, OBSTETrICs 502 (1966).
See also expert affidavits submitted in Hodgson, supra. It should be noted, however,
that viability is defined in Great Britain as twenty weeks. STDMAN's MEDICAL DIc-
TIoNARY 1388 (22d ed. 1972).
14. Cases involving the obligation of municipal hospitals to perform abortions in-
clude Doe v. Poelker, 497 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220
(1976) (No. 75-442); Doe v. Hale Hosp., 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974); Doe v. Mundy,
378 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Wis. 1974), affd, 514 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1975); Nyberg v.
City of Virginia, 361 F. Supp. 932 (D. Minn. 1973); aff'd, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 891 (1974). Analogous cases involve the obligation of municipal
hospitals to perform sterilization operations. See Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp.,
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who cannot afford them?15
The first of these questions was answered in 1976 in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth,"6 where the Court invalidated several chal-
lenged provisions of a Missouri abortion statute enacted after Wade and
Bolton. The Court held unconstitutional the state's spousal and paren-
tal' 7 consent requirements for abortions on the ground that the state
cannot "delegate to a [third party] a veto power which the state itself is
absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the first trimes-
ter of pregnancy."' 8 The Court also set aside the state's prohibition on
the saline amniocentesis abortion method" and its requirement that
physicians attempt to preserve fetal life.20  Although it failed to define
an exact point of fetal viability,2' the Court upheld a provision requiring
the woman's written consent to abortion22 and mandating that facilities
and physicians maintain certain records of abortions performed.23
More recently, the Court has agreed to hear arguments in three
cases raising the remaining abortion issues. Doe v. Poelker4 involves
the refusal of a city hospital to permit indigents to receive abortions
therein. Roe v. Norton2 5 raises the issue of whether the Constitution
requires states to provide abortions for women eligible for Medicaid.
475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973); McCabe v. Nassau County Medical Center, 453 F.2d 698
(2d Cir. 1971).
Some courts have held that receipt by private hospitals of federal Hill-Burton Act
funds for hospital construction or Medicaid and Medicare funds does not render them
"public" institutions required to perform abortions. Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp.
Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975); Chrisman v. Sisters
of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974); Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp.,
479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973). Contra, Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. 529
F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975). See generally Comment, Hill-Burton Hospitals After Roe
and Doe: Can Federally Funded Hospitals Refuse to Perform Abortions? 4 N.Y.U. REv.
L. &Soc.C C'oE 83 (1974).
15. This argument was briefed to the Court by the National Health Law Program
as amicus curiae. See Charles & Alexander, Abortions for Poor and Nonwhite Women:
A Denial of Equal Protection?, 23 HAsTiNGs L.J. 147 (1971).
16. 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
17. Id. at 2840-44.
18. Id. at 2841, quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1375
(E.D. Mo. 1975).
19. 96 S. Ct. at 2844-45.
20. Id. at 2847-48.
21. Id. at 2838-39.
22. Id. at 2839-40.
23. Id. at 2846-47.
24. 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976) (No. 75-
442).
25. 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Maher v.
Roe, 96 S. Ct. 3219 (1976) (No. 75-1440).
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Doe v. Bea126 challenges a state's failure to pay for abortion as a violation
of the Medicaid statute.
While Poelker, Norton, and Beal were pending in the Supreme
Court, Congress complicated resolution of the public funding issue by
enacting, over a presidential veto, the "Hyde amendment" to the appro-
priations bill funding HEW and the Department of Labor for the fiscal
year 1977.28 This appropriations "rider," arguably an inappropriate
vehicle for substantive policy legislation, 29 permits federal payments for
abortion only in cases "where the life of the mother would be endan-
gered if the fetus were carried to term."3 0  That provision is under
constitutional attack. 1 In one of these cases, McRae v. Mathews,
3 2
pregnant Medicaid eligibles obtained a preliminary injunction, national
in scope and still effective, prohibiting enforcement of the amendment.
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York there noted that
by withholding federal payment for elective abortions Congress im-
paired the exercise of the fundamental right of these women to choose
abortion as a treatment for their pregnancies.8"
The Supreme Court is now faced with three interrelated but sepa-
rate questions. Doe v. Bea134 raises the issue of whether the Medicaid
statute's requirement that all recipients be treated equally mandates
states to pay for all abortions under the program, regardless of whether
they are elective or "medically required." Since the Hyde amendment
26. 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976) (No. 75-
554).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-97(f) (1970 & Supp. V, 1975).
28. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1418.
29. Such a procedure runs counter to Congress' own procedural rules and does
not afford the opportunity for committees to investigate and analyze the amendment's
impact. 122 CoNG. Ruc. H 8632 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Abzug).
Abzug).
30. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434. Legislative
history indicates congressional willingness to broaden the permissible payments to in-
clude rape and incest victims and certain health risks. This evidence would not be
relevant to aid in the interpretation of the Hyde amendment since the literal statutory
language is clear on its face. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287
U.S. 77, 83 (1932); McDonald v. Best, 186 F. Supp. 217, 221 (N.D. Cal. 1960);
United States v. Toma, 148 F. Supp. 489 (C.D. Cal. 1957).
31. McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Doe v. Mathews, 420
F. Supp. 865 (D.N.J. 1976); Doe v. Mathews, Civil No. 76-1835 (D.D.C., Oct. 21,
1976).
32. McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
33. Id. at 542.
34. 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976) (No. 75-
554).
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was passed as part of an appropriations bill and did not amend the
Medicaid law itself, the argument for equality of treatment is still viable.
Similarly, Roe v. Norton35 questions whether a state's refusal to pay for
abortions under Medicaid while it pays for prenatal care and delivery
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Hyde amendment's restriction of federal payments for Medicaid abor-
tions can be interpreted as not affecting the constitutional obligation of a
state to provide equal payment for alternative treatments without federal
help, in which case the issues raised in Norton are still ripe for review. 30
In view of the issues presented by these cases, this article will
examine the constitutionality of longstanding state policies restricting
Medicaid payment for abortion and of the Hyde amendment itself. In
approaching these issues, primary consideration will be given to theories
used by litigants attempting to compel Medicaid funding of elective
abortions. To provide a context in which these arguments may be
understood, the scope of the Medicaid program will be examined brief-
ly, as will the limitations states traditionally have placed on Medicaid
payments. First, however, discussion will center on the question wheth-
er there is an absolute constitutional right to public funding of voluntary
abortions outside the Medicaid program.
Obligations of the States in Funding
Abortions for the Poor
Advocates of the right of women to terminate unwanted pregnan-
cies by means of abortion argue that, totally apart from Medicaid, the
state is constitutionally mandated to fund the abortions of those unable
to afford the operation.37  Proponents of this position argue that by
refusing to pay for abortions for poor women while allowing women
who can afford the procedure to procure it, the state creates a classifica-
tion, based solely on wealth, of two groups of women seeking to exercise
their right to choose abortion. However, the Supreme Court has thus
far refused to term poverty a suspect classification sufficient to trigger
35. 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Maher v. Roe,
96 S. Ct. 3219 (1976) (No. 75-1440).
36. It is possible that the Supreme Court will remand both Norton and Beal for
reconsideration in light of the Hyde amendment, since it has assiduously avoided de-
ciding the Medicaid abortion issue in the past. See, e.g., Doe v. Westby, 383 F. Supp.
1143 (D.S.D. 1974), vacated, 420 U.S. 968 (1975). That case was remanded by the
Supreme Court for consideration of the statutory issue before reaching the constitutional
one. See also Singleton v. Wulff, 96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976).
37. No court has so far made such a ruling. See Comment, Abortion on Demand
in a Post-Wade Context: Must the State Pay the Bills?, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 921, 929-
31 (1973).
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the strict scrutiny equal protection analysis requiring states to advance a
compelling interest to justify discriminating between two similarly situat-
ed classes of individuals."' Nor has the Court held that the receipt of
welfare benefits3" or health care is a fundamental right which a state
may curb only to serve a compelling interest. If unable to establish that
a state's refusal to fund abortions for all poor women either creates a
suspect classification based on wealth or infringes a fundamental right, a
plaintiff can argue only that the policy lacks a rational basis. Yet the
Court has said that conserving the public fisc, the obvious rationale, is
sufficient to satisfy this test. 0
Courts have compelled states to fund the exercise of certain consti-
tutional rights in other contexts. However, because they have involved
access to the judicial or legislative process, the cases obligating states to
cover the costs of indigents are probably distinguishable from the case of
a poor woman seeking an abortion. For example, in Griffin v.
Illinois,4' the Court required the state to provide transcripts or suspend
court fees for indigent crimiial defendants. That case and others
following it42 pertained to state created financial barriers to a criminal
defendant's access to the courts. Similarly, in Boddie v. Connecticut,
43
a case specifically abolishing financial obstacles to the poor in civil
litigation, the Court held that due process requires states to waive
divorce court filing fees for indigents. The Court based its decision on
the fact that the state controls the exclusive means of obtaining divorce.
Subsequent cases challenging filing fees for indigents in bankruptcy and
appellate courts have limited the application of Boddie to those funda-
mental constitutional interests surrounding the family." The United
38. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973).
39. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 491 (1970).
40. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972). A state can refuse to offer
a service for this reason. However, once it in fact offers such a service, a state cannot
use it to interfere impermissibly in the lives of recipients. See Klein v. Nassau County
Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 500-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated, 412 U.S. 925-26
(1973). Cases like Klein make it clear that when a state offers medical benefits to
pregnant women but refuses them abortions, it is not doing so to save money, since the
cost of childbirth is much higher than the cost of abortion. Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112,
1117 (10th Cir. 1974).
41. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
42. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Draper v. Washington,
372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963). See also Harper v. Virginia
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
43. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
44. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973).
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States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in Klein v.
Nassau County Medical Center4 5 did cite Boddie in its opinion holding
that the state's limitation of Medicaid payments for abortions violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by discriminat-
ing between indigent and nonindigent women.4 6 However, since Klein
preceded those cases narrowing the application of Boddie, the court was
not called upon to clarify the apparent distinctions between access to the
courts and access to health care services.
Because the Supreme Court has elevated the right to choose abor-
tion to the level of a fundamental interest, it might be argued that if the
state monopolized the means of obtaining access to abortion, the Boddie
holding would govern.4 7  Perhaps licensing the physicians and the
facilities performing abortions is sufficient "state monopoly" to justify
applying this reasoning. However, imposing on states the absolute
responsibility to pay a physician to perform an abortion is substantially
different from requiring states to waive fees they would otherwise col-
lect, as it creates an affirmative duty to pay a third party to provide a
service. Logically extended, this argument would require states to pay
for all medical care-or at least that care involving a "basic necessity of
life"&4 -for all residents because some persons can afford to purchase it
from state-licensed providers. Courts have not gone so far under any
constitutional doctrine.
Furthermore, in light of recent Supreme Court cases, 9 there is
little likelihood that a state will be constitutionally required to provide
free access either to abortion or to other kinds of medical care for its
citizens.5" None of the plaintiffs in the cases arising after Wade and
45. 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated, 412 U.S. 925-26 (1973), on
remand, 409 F. Supp. 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), appeal docketed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S.
July 27, 1976) (No. 75-813). See notes 109, 158, & accompanying text infra.
46. 347 F. Supp. at 500-01.
47. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 386 (1971) (Douglas, J., con-
curring). But see Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 193-95 (W.D. Pa. 1974)
(Weis, J., dissenting), modified sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976) (No. 75-554).
48. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974) (health care
found a basic necessity but not a fundamental right).
49. See, e.g., United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086 (1976); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). But see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). The
Court has not faced many equal protection cases since San Antonio School Dist. v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). But recently it has severely limited similar arguments based
on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 96
S. Ct. 893 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
50. See Carey, A Constitutional Right to Health Care: An Unlikely Development,
23 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 492 (1974).
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Bolton has attempted to advance such an argument.51 Fortunately, it
has been possible to make far stronger constitutional and statutory
arguments in the context of the Medicaid program.
The Federal Medicaid'Program
Medicaid, the federal system of medical assistance for the indigent,
was enacted in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act.5 2  Funded
jointly by state and federal governments, 53 Medicaid is a state-adminis-
tered program designed to pay the costs of medical care for most welfare
recipients and certain other poor individuals.54 States are not required
to participate in Medicaid, but if they choose to do so,15 they must
comply with the federal statutes and regulations which outline general
program requirements." Participating states must establish plans detail-
ing the groups of persons covered, the types of services offered, and the
minimum conditions which health care providers must meet under the
program.
Federal law requires states to provide recipients of federal welfare
programs for dependent children5" and the aged, blind and disabled58-
the categorically needy-with at least seven basic benefits: physician
services; inpatient hospital services; outpatient hospital services; x-ray
and laboratory services; nursing home services; family planning services;
and early childhood screeningY0  Just over half the states under Medi-
51. One court, however, apparently misunderstood plaintiffs' equal protection
argument and held that the Constitution did not require Medicaid payment for abortion
because the case dealt "with low income status and not with a suspect classification...
and . . there is no constitutional right to receive public welfare .... " Doe v. Stewart,
No. 74-3197, at n.38 (E.D. La., Jan. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 75-6721, 5th Cir.,
May 26, 1976. Considering this court's misconception of the constitutional argument,
its holding should not presage the result of other courts faced with this issue.
52. Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121, 79 Stat. 343 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396-96d (1970 & Supp. V, 1975)).
53. The federal government provides between 50% and 83% of the funds, de-
pending on state income. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
54. For a practical overview of the Medicaid system, see Butler, The Medicaid
Program: Current Statutory Requirements and Judicial Interpretations, 8 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 7 (1974). For an historical overview, see S. STEVENS & R. STEVENS,
WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA (1974).
55. All states now participate in the Medicaid program, although Arizona's pro-
gram is not scheduled to begin until July 1977.
56. Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S.
282 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-02 (Supp. V, 1975).
58. Id. §§ 1381-84. A 1972 Medicaid amendment permitted states to exclude
some of those recipients. Id. § 1396a(f).
59. Id. §§ 1396a(a)(10), (13)(B), 1396d(a)(1)-(5) (1970 &Supp. V, 1975).
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caid also cover people who have too much income or too many resources
to qualify for welfare, but who are aged, blind, disabled or dependent
children within the meaning of the welfare laws. These are the so-
called medically needy.6" States covering the medically needy must
provide either the basic seven services noted above or seven of the
sixteen services listed in the Medicaid law, including some institutional
and some noninstitutional services, such as drugs, eyeglasses, and dental
care.' Besides providing seven required services, states have the option
of offering any additional listed services to both the categorically needy
and the medically needy.6 2  Any service offered the medically needy
must also be offered to the categorically needy. "3 This is the so-called
"comparability" requirement.
Medicaid is a vendor payment program designed to reimburse
providers of health care for services rendered to program beneficiaries.64
It will pay for services if a recipient can locate a provider to treat him or
her, but it does not guarantee the availability or accessibility of provid-
ers. Because of increasingly burdensome administrative procedures for
obtaining payment and because of disparities between fees paid by
Medicaid and those paid by private patients, many providers refuse to
treat Medicaid patients.65 Furthermore, physicians and hospitals par-
ticipating in the program may choose not to perform abortions. There-
fore, it must be remembered that even if restrictive state Medicaid
abortion policies are successfully challenged, beneficiaries may still have
difficulty finding a provider who will perform the service.
The Medicaid statute prescribes the categories of services which
states must cover and specifically permits states to cover many others
voluntarily; however, the law does not define the extent of each service,
leaving this task largely up to the states. 66 Thus, states may define the
scope of provided services, the duration of provided services (for exam-
ple, thirty days of hospital care per year), and the amount of services
available (for example, ten physician visits per month). The federal
statute contains no guidelines regarding the manner in which a state
may limit benefits.
60. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(C) (Supp. V, 1975).
61. Id. §§ 1396a(a)(13)(C), 1396d(a)(1)-(16) (1970 &Supp. V, 1975).
62. Id. § 1396d(a).
63. Id. § 1396a(a)(10) (B) (Supp. V, 1975).
64. ld. § 1396d(a).
65. See Butler, The Medicaid Program: Current Statutory Requirements and Judi-
cial Interpretations, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 7, 14-15 (1974).
66. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10), (14), (17), 1396d(a) (1970 & Supp. V,
1975).
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Federal Medicaid regulations are not much more enlightening than
the statute in defining the permissible amount or duration of services.
One set of regulations defines the maximum amont of services for which
the federal government will provide its share of funds67 but does not
clearly prescribe minimum definitions. Another regulation requires
that all covered services "must be sufficient in amount, duration and
scope to reasonably achieve their purpose."6 8  With respect to the
required services for the welfare recipient group,
the state may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration,
or scope of, such services to an otherwise eligible individual solely
because of the diagnosis, type of illness or condition,A
Thus, if a state offers eyeglasses to this group, it cannot limit the services
to those with pathological eye conditions only. Eyeglasses do as much,
if not more, to improve the vision of those with refractive vision errors as
they do to improve the vision of those with eye diseases. Such a
limitation runs afoul of the above regulation.70
The Medicaid statute does not specifically mention abortion.71 This
is not unusual, since it does not single out any particular medical
procedure. Instead, it merely states general service categories such as
physician, inpatient, and nursing home services. In this regard, it must
be remembered that although the Hyde amendment to the HEW appro-
priations bill prohibited the use of the federal funds included in that bill
for abortion, it did not change the Medicaid statute itself.
Congress amended the Medicaid statute in 1972 to include family
planning services, 72 but it did not call attention to abortion in enacting
these amendments. 7 3  In light of public health definitions of family
planning and congressional treatment of abortion in other laws prior to
adoption of the Hyde amendment, some courts have inferred that when
Congress added Medicaid coverage for family planning services without
expressly excluding abortions, it intended such services to include abor-
tions.74 This inference was plausible since Congress specifically exclud-
67. 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(b) (1976).
68. Id. § 249.10(a) (5) (i).
69. Id.
70. White v. Beal, 413 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See notes 186-88 & ac-
companying text infra.
71. Doe v. Rose, 499 F. 2d 1112, 1114 (10th Cir. 1974).
72. Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603 § 299E, 86 Stat. 1462, amending
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C) (Supp. V,
1975)).
73. See S. RaP. No. 92-1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1972).
74. E.g., Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 622-23 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S.
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ed abortions from family planning services when it enacted other legisla-
tion.-, Additional evidence for the proposition that the congressional
purpose was to include abortion in the family planning services provi-
sion of Medicaid was provided by the fact that before 1976 Congress
had entertained but had refused to enact two amendments designed, like
the Hyde amendment, to prohibit the use of federal Medicaid funds for
abortion.71
The Hyde amendment was generated in the spring and summer of
1976 when Congress debated a forerunner to the now existing provi-
sion. 77 The House of Representatives passed this original version of the
appropriations amendment by a wide margin." s The Senate, however,
refused to accept it. As the end of the fiscal year approached, the
Senate eventually agreed to accept the amendment, modified to read as
follows:
None of the funds contained in this Act shall be used to perform
abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered
if the fetus were carried to term.
7 9
The conference report on the amendment explained that Congress in-
tended the amendment
to limit the financing of abortions under the Medicaid program
to instances where the performance of an abortion is deemed by
a physician to be of medical necessity and to prohibit payment
for abortions as a method of family planning, or for emotional
or social convenience.80
The report also expressed a congressional intent to permit abortions in
cases of rape or incest and stressed that the amendment was not de-
signed to forbid teaching of or research into abortion procedures by
federally funded medical schools.8" Acknowledging the existence of
Norton, Beal, and Poelker, the three abortion cases pending before the
Ct. 3220 (1976) (No. 75-554). But see cases cited in note 179 infra. There is some
disagreement among health experts whether abortion is a family planning service, since
it is clearly not the best method for regular family planning.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970). See also id. § 2996f(b)(8) (Supp. V, 1975).
76. H.R. 3153, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 198D (1973). The bill became law without
this provision restricting use of federal funds for abortion. Act of July 1, 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-48, §§ 1-2, 89 Stat. 247, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1970) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a), (23) (Supp. V, 1975)). The Bartlett amendment to the 1974
HEW appropriations bill would have prohibited using any HEW funds, including Medi-
caid monies, for abortions. See 120 CONG. REC. S 16,832 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1974).
77. H.R. 14232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
78. 122 CONG. REC. H 6,661 (daily ed. June 24, 1976).
79. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434.
80. H.R. REP. No. 1555, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976).
81. Id.
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Supreme Court,82 the report noted that "Congress in its action upon this
particular appropriations bill [did] not intend to prejudge any constitu-
tional questions involved in those cases."83 Yet, rather than waiting for
judicial guidance on the constitutional aspects of the funding issue
before legislating on the subject, Congress adopted the Hyde amend-
ment, overrode a presidential veto of the bill,14 and thereby complicated
the status of the cases before the Court. Some observers fear that the
Court will remand both Beal and Norton for consideration of the effect
of the amendment, an action which would serve only to postpone final
resolution of the important issues involved.8 5
Should the Court decide, however, to determine the constitutionali-
ty of the Hyde amendment, the fate of existing state policies restricting
the use of funds under the Medicaid statute may also be decided. The
soundness of these state plans is open to question, both because they
violate statutory principles of the Medcaid law and because they are
subject to constitutional attack. The general outline of these programs
is therefore set out in the following section as a backdrop to a discussion
of the constitutional and statutory arguments relating to the Medicaid
abortion question.
State Limits on Medicaid Payment for Abortion
In response to the Wade and Bolton decisions, most states have
repealed their obviously unconstitutional criminal sanctions against
abortions."' Many states, however, have adopted laws which limit
access to abortion by requiring parental or spousal consent or by prohib-
iting Medicaid payment for abortion. Some state Medicaid agencies
have been issued antiabortion regulations without express legislative
mandate or authorization. 88 State policies restricting Medicaid payment
for abortion have generally demanded that abortion be "medically indi-
cated"' ' 0-that is, necessitated by a threat to the mother's life or health 0
82. See notes 24-36 & accompanying text supra.
83. Id.
84. 122 CONG. REc. S 17,304, H 11,860 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1976).
85. See note 36 supra.
86. See, e.g., 2 FAMILY PLANNING POPULATION REP. 47-49, 80-81, (1973).
87. See, e.g., 4 id. 113 (1975); 3 id. 34 (1974); 2 id. 47, 145 (1973).
88. See, e.g., S.D. Dep't of Social Servs. R. 28 D.210 (1976).
89. See, e.g., Doe v. Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143, 1145 (D.S.D. 1974), vacated,
420 U.S. 968 (1975) (South Dakota regulation); Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (D.
Conn. 1974), rev'd, 552 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975) (Connecticut regulation); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 208.152(12) (Supp. 1976).
90. See, e.g., Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112, 1113 (10th Cir. 1974) (Utah informal
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or by a combination of other factors. These factors may include
requirements that the pregnancy result from rape or incest, that physical
deformity of the child be apparent, that two additional physicians
concur in the decision to abort, or that the procedure be performed only
in hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission on Hospital Accredita-
tion. States have also required "prior authorization" for the proce-
dure."'
Many states have justified such restrictions on the ground that the
federal Medicaid law authorizes payment of federal funds only for
services which are "medically necessary." They argue that this limita-
tion arises in the preamble to the Medicaid law, which describes the
principal objective of Title XIX as payment for "medical assistance on
behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or
disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to
meet the costs of necessary medical services . ". .. , They conclude
that abortion was not meant to be included in this goal.
These state programs have given rise to concern over widespread
discrimination against the poor in obtaining access to abortions. Many
litigants have called these restrictive policies into question.
Litigation To Compel Medicaid Payment for Abortion
To date, seventeen suits have been filed challenging restrictive state
Medicaid programs," and three have been filed challenging the Hyde
policy); Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072, 1078 (D.N.H. 1976) (New Hampshire regu-
lation); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 578 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(Pennsylvania statute).
91. See, e.g., Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 662 (D. Conn. 1975) (Connecticut
regulation).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1) (Supp. V, 1975).
93. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220
(1976) (No. 75-554); Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975); Wulff v. Single-
ton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976); Doe v. Rose, 499
F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974); Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 409 F. Supp. 731
(E.D.N.Y. 1976); Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.H. 1976); Doe v. Klein,
Civil No. 1-76-134 (D. Idaho, Jan. 1976); Doe v. Stewart, No. 74-3197 (E.D. La., Jan.
26, 1976), appeal docketed, No. 75-6721, 5th Cir., May 26, 1976; Doe v. Klein, Civil
No. 76-74 (D.N.J., Feb. 2, 1976); Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975),
prob. juris. noted sub non. Maher v. Roe, 96 S. Ct. 3219 (1976)(No. 75-1440); Doe
v. Westby, 402 F. Supp. 140 (D.S.D. 1975), appeal docketed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S.
July 27, 1976) (No. 75-813); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp.
554 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Doe v. O'Bannon, Civil No. 4-74 (D. Minn., Aug. 1, 1975); Smith
v. Tinder, Civil No. 75-0380CH (S.D.W. Va., Aug. 8, 1975); Doe v. Myatt, No. 43-
74-48 (D.N.D., Oct. 30, 1975); Doe v. Bowen, No. IP74-187C (N.D. Ind. 1974); Doe
v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973).
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amendment.94 Plaintiffs in all but two of these cases9" included women
eligible for Medicaid who were pregnant at the time they filed suit. Even
though several of the pregnant plaintiffs received abortions during the
course of the litigation, either through preliminary injunctive orders96 or
without that guarantee of payment, 97 they had no difficulty in maintain-
ing their standing to prosecute the cases. The Supreme Court in Wade
established the standing of a woman, pregnant at the time of filing, whose
pregnancy ends before resolution of the case. 8 Although termination of
the pregnancy might appear to moot such a case, the Court found that
the situation presented a classic example of an exception to the mootness
doctrine: a condition which is "capable of repetition, yet evading
review." 99
In addition to allowing individual plaintiffs to sue, some courts
have permitted women's groups to prosecute Medicaid abortion suits.100
The Supreme Court has recently established the right of physicians
alone to bring suit on behalf of their Medicaid patients, on the grounds
that restrictive state policies interfere with the physician-patient relation-
ship and that the physician is a competent representative of the patient's
interest.' 0'
Constitutional Implications of States' Refusal To Fund Abortions
The constitutional arguments in favor of requiring states to fund
abortions under Medicaid are very strong and persuasive. This is true
even in light of the Hyde amendment, since that prqvision limits pay-
ment of federal funds but arguably does not directly affect state action.
94. McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Doe v. Mathews, 420
F. Supp. 865 (D.N.J. 1976); Doe v. Mathews, Civil No. 76-1835 (D.D.C. Oct. 21,
1976).
95. Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2868
(1976); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
96. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975); McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp.
533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Doe v. Mathews, Civil No. 76-1835 (D.D.C., Oct. 1, 1976); Doe
v. Klein, Civil No. 76-74 (D.N.J., Feb. 2, 1976); Doe v. Stewart, No. 74-3197 (E.D.
La., Jan. 26, 1976); Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. at 728 (D. Conn. 1974), rev'd, 552
F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975).
97. Doe v. Westby, 402 F. Supp. 140 (D.S.D. 1975) (3-judge ct.), appeal docketed,
45 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 27, 1976) (No. 75-813).
98. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1973).
99. Id., quoting Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911);
see Doe v. Poelker, 497 F.2d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 1973), prob. furis, noted, 96 S. Ct.
3220 (1976) (No. 75-442); Doe v. O'Bannon, Civil No. 4-74 (D. Minn., Aug. 1, 1975).
100. See, e.g., Roe v. Ferguson, 389 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Ohio 1974), rev'd, 515 F.2d
279 (6th Cir. 1975).
101. Singleton v. Wulff, 96 S. Ct. 2868, 2873-76 (1976).
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Equal Protection of the Laws
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits
a state from discriminating between two similarly situated groups of
people unless the state can defend the disparate treatment. The Supreme
Court has developed two tests for equal protection. If the state's action
infringes upon a fundamental constitutional right or involves a suspect
classification such as race, the state must advance a compelling interest
to justify its discrimination. Where there is neither a suspect classifica-
tion nor a fundamental right-for example, in the case of welfare
benefits-the discrimination will be upheld if it is rationally related to a
legitimate state policy.
In establishing restrictive state Medicaid abortion policies, states
have classified similarly situated women eligible for Medicaid in at least
three different ways: (1) pregnant women who require abortions to
protect life or health as against those who wish abortions but do not
need them to preserve life or health; (2) pregnant women who seek to
carry their pregnancies to term as against those who seek abortion; and
(3) women seeking various types of surgery as against those seeking
abortion. In addition, it is possible to analyze the state restrictions on
Medicaid abortions as discriminating between nonindigent women,
whose access to abortions was unimpeded, and indigent women depen-
dent upon Medicaid whose access to abortions was severely curtailed.
Because the right to choose abortion in the first trimester is a fundamen-
tal adjunct to the right of privacy and in the second trimester is a right
qualified only by the state's interest in protecting the mother, the state
must advance a compelling interest for such discrimination. 112 Courts
have held that states have been unable to rationalize their antiabortion
policies under either the compelling interest test or the less stringent
rational basis test.
Discrimination Among Women Seeking Abortion
The state Medicaid abortion policies discussed above discriminate
between two groups of Medicaid eligibles who seek abortion: women
requiring the procedure to protect life or health and women seeking it
for reasons which might not be characterized as medical. In Doe v.
Rose,"0 3 the United States District Court in Utah analyzed by means of
this classification the state's policy of paying only for those abortions
102. See notes 38-40 & accompanying text supra.
103. 380F. Supp. 779 (D. Utah 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974).
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necessary to save the mother's life or to prevent serious and permanent
impairment of her physical health. In its conclusions of law, the court
invalidated the policy as an impermissible discrimination between wom-
en seeking therapeutic abortions and those seeking nontherapeutic
ones. 11 4 Without defining the precise classes involved in the discrimina-
tion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed, 1 5 holding that the state must advance a legitimate and com-
pelling interest to warrant such discrimination. The court found that
saving the public fisc is not a sufficiently compelling interest, because
fundamental rights were involved. 1°6 Indeed, concern for saving public
funds was held to be insufficient even under the rational basis test, since
abortion is less costly than prenatal care and subsequent delivery.'0 7 The
court further held that the state may not justify its policy on moral
grounds.'0 "
Discrimination Among Pregnant Women
Many courts have characterized state abortion classifications as
discriminating between pregnant women who wish to terminate their
pregnancies by delivery and pregnant women who wish to terminate
their pregnancies by abortion. Actually, since all states pay for at least
those abortions under Medicaid which are required to save the mother's
life, this representation is not quite accurate, but it appears to have the
greatest appeal to the courts.
In the first Medicaid abortion case, Klein v. Nassau County Medi-
cal Center,' a federal district court in New York found that the state's
policy of paying for abortions only when necessary to preserve the health
of the mother created two classes of pregnant medicaid eligibles-those
who choose to bear the child and those who choose to abort."0  State
action as to both these classifications was found to be unconstitutional.
A finding of unconstitutionality, however, was not based on the "strict
scrutiny" test. A year before Wade and Bolton, the court was willing to
104. Id. at 781-82.
105. 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974).
106. Id. at 1117.
107. Id., quoting Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 500-
01 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated, 412 U.S. 925 (1973).
108. 499 F.2d at 1117.
109. 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated, 412 U.S. 925 (1973). The Su-
preme Court vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the Wade
and Bolton cases.
110. "The pregnant woman may not be denied necessary medical assistance because
she has made an unwarrantedly disfavored choice ... ." 347 F. Supp. at 500.
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do no more than suggest that there "may well be" a fundamental right to
choose abortion.11' Rather, the classifications fell under the rational
basis test, as the court found no supportable reason for the state to
discriminate against indigent women seeking elective abortion.-
1 12
Following the Klein reasoning, the federal district court in Doe v.
Wohlgemuth"' found that Pennsylvania's restrictions on elective abor-
tions, 14 like New York's, unconstitutionally discriminated "between in-
digent women who choose to carry their pregnancies to birth, and
indigent women who choose to terminate their pregnancies by abor-
tion."'15  In light of Wade and Bolton, the Wohlgemuth court applied
the strict scrutiny test 1 6 to determine that the state's reasons for invad-
ing the plaintiffs' constitutional rights to privacy were not sufficiently
compelling." 7
The court did restrict its holding to the first trimester of pregnan-
cy, 118 but did not clearly explain this limitation. In affirming the lower
court's decision on statutory grounds, the Third Circuit in Doe v. Beal"
111. Id.
112. The court ruled that "[n]o interest of the State is served by the arbitrary
discrimination ...... Id. Saving public funds was rejected as a rationale since alter-
native care for pregnancy was more expensive than abortion. Also, since New York
had repealed its antiabortion laws, the state was held to have no interest in discouraging
abortions. If such an interest existed, the court ruled that the state could not single
out indigent women as the sole class against whom this interest could be enforced. 347
F. Supp. at 500-01, citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971 ).
113. 376 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1974), modified sub noin. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d
611 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976) (No. 75-554).
114. The challenged restrictions were regulations of the Pennsylvania Department
of Public Welfare. They required that two physicians concur in writing that the abortion
is necessary and they provided that abortions were compensable only in the following
situations: (1) the health of the mother was threatened; (2) the fetus showed evidence
of physical deformity or mental deficiency; or (3) the pregnancy resulted from rape or
incest and the pregnancy was a threat to the mother's health.
115. Id. at 191.
116. Id. at 189.
117. The state presented two rationales for its regulations. First, it claimed an in-
terest in saving public funds by withholding reimbursement for elective abortions. This
was rejected as irrational in light of higher costs for other treatment for pregnancy. Id.
at 187. In addition, "fiscal integrity" was held to be insufficient in general as a justi-
fication for invading the constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 188. Second, the state
claimed that its regulations were rational because they were drawn up by a panel of
doctors concerned about the conditions under which abortions were performed. This
argument was rejected on the basis of language in Roe v. Wade which made clear that
the state cannot interfere in consultations between doctor and patient in the first tri-
mester of pregnancy. 376 F. Supp. at 189, quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163
(1973).
118. 376 F. Supp. at 190.
119. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220
(1976) (No. 75-554).
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specifically directed the court to modify its order and invalidate Pennsyl-
vania's restrictions in the first and second trimesters because "the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court have forced the states to include elective
abortion in the legal practice of medicine through the second trimester
of pregnancy ... "12
Several other courts have since adopted the approach of Wohlge-
muth and Klein in analyzing discriminatory systems and in holding that
neither state fiscal policies nor moral concerns can justify restrictions on
use of Medicaid funds for abortion. 2' States have not been able to
advance reasons justifying restrictive policies under either the strict
scrutiny or rational basis tests. Fiscal justifications have been roundly
rejected, as abortion is far less costly than a course of prenatal care
followed by delivery.' 2 2  The cost of supporting the child on welfare
after it is born is also considerable. 23  Furthermore, early abortion is
medically safer than childbirth,' 24 so that states cannot rationally claim
to be protecting maternal health by refusing to provide Medicaid funds
for abortion.
Discrimination Between Abortion and Other Surgery
No court has explicitly defined the classes created by restrictive
Medicaid abortion plans in terms of pregnant women seeking abortion
120. Id. at 622, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). The court did
suggest that the state could require that second trimester abortions be performed in a
manner which would safeguard the mother's health-that is, in a hospital. Id. n.25.
121. Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2868
(1976); Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 665 (D. Conn. 1975); Doe v. Westby, 402
F. Supp. 140 (D.S.D. 1975) (3-judge ct.), appeal docketed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S.
July 27, 1976) (No. 75-813); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp.
554, 581 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Doe v. Myatt, No. 43-74-48 (D.N.D. Oct. 30, 1975). One
court has held that a state's restrictive Medicaid abortion policy violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. It did not clearly define the classes
created. Doe v. O'Bannon, Civil No. 4-74, at 69 (D. Minn., Aug. 1, 1975).
122. On the average, first trimester abortions under Medicaid cost $150, and second
trimester abortions cost $350. See generally HEW Memorandum, Effects of General
Provision 413 of the Labor-HEW Act, 120 CoNG. REC. 19678 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1974).
The average cost of childbirth under Medicaid ranges from five hundred to eight hun-
dred dollars. Jaffee, Short-Term Costs and Benefits of United States Family Planning
Programs, 5 STUDIES IN FAMILY PLANNING 101 (1974).
123. The cost of the child's first year in public assistance is at least $2,000.
Memorandum on effects of section 209 from Deputy Ass't Secretary for Population Af-
fairs, Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare to House-Senate Conference Committee on
Labor-HEW Appropriations Bill, June 25, 1976.
124. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 (1973).
March 1977] MEDICAID PAYMENTS FOR ABORTION
and women, whether pregnant or not, requesting other surgical proce-
dures of similar medical complexity and risk. However, one court
examining state restrictions on other procedures involving the same
constitutional right to privacy has analyzed the problem in these terms.
In Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital,125 the plaintiff, who
would have been endangered from further pregnancy, sought and was
refused surgical sterilization from the local municipal hospital. Bring-
ing suit in federal court, she claimed that the hospital's policy against
performing sterilization operations violated her rights under the equal
protection clause. The First Circuit agreed. The hospital's board of
directors, the court said, had broad discretion to allow or disallow
surgical procedures. Sterilization was disallowed, but nontherapeutic
surgery of comparable medical risk and complexity was permitted. The
court stated:
[T]he hospital is not required to perform all kinds of nonthera-
peutic or even all therapeutic surgical procedures. [But] once the
state has undertaken to provide general short term hospital care,
as here, it may not constitutionally draw the line at medically
indistinguishable surgical procedures that impinge on fundamental
rights. 12
6
Looking to the Wade and Bolton decisions, the court concluded that a
fundamental right had in fact been infringed:
While Roe and Doe dealt with a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate a particular pregnancy, a decision to terminate the
possibility of any future pregnancy would seem to embrace all of
the factors deemed important by the Court in Roe in finding a
fundamental interest, but in magnified form, particularly...
given the demonstrated danger to appellant's life .... 127
Since Hathaway equates sterilization with abortion procedures, the case
is valid precedent for the principle that a state offering nontherapeutic
surgical procedures to a similarly situated class of persons cannot with-
hold abortions from members of that same class. Considering the
success of other equal protection approaches, this characterization of the
classifications arising from restrictive abortion policies is not of critical
importance, but it does appear to be viable, although the Supreme
Court's most recent abortion opinions suggest that states may impose
125. 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973).
126. Id. at 706.
127. Id. at 705 (emphasis added & citations omitted). The court also noted that
the state's interest in preserving the life of future fetuses was even less compelling than
the state's interest in preserving existing fetuses, which Roe v. Wade held insufficiently
compelling during the first trimester of pregnancy.
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some requirements on abortion which they do not impose on other
surgery.1
28
Discrimination Between Nonindigent and Indigent Women
Two cases have found illegal discrimination between the class of
nonindigent women who, because they are dependent upon their statuto-
ry entitlement to state supported Medicaid, are being denied access to
elective abortions.
The first of these cases is Klein v. Nassau County Medical
Center,'2 9 which also found discrimination between Medicaid recipients
choosing to bear children and Medicaid recipients choosing to abort.
The court also found the discrimination based on wealth to be of
concern:
The directive, and the State statute, if interpreted as mandating
the Commissioner's directive, would deny indigent women the
equal protection of the laws to which they are constitutionally
entitled. They alone are subjected to State coercion to bear chil-
dren which they do not wish to bear, and no other women simi-
larly situated are so coerced. Other women, able to afford the
medical cost of either a justifiable abortional act or ful term child
birth, have complete freedom to make the choice in the light of the
manifold of considerations directly relevant to the problem unin-
hibited by any State action. The indigent is advised by the State
that the State will deny her medical assistance unless she resigns
her freedom of choice and bears the child. She is denied the
medical assistance that is in general her statutory entitlement,
and that is otherwise extended to her even with respect to her
pregnancy.
30
The court found that the state had no legitimate interest to justify such a
discrimination.'
Klein, it will be remembered, is a decision predating Wade and
Bolton, and it therefore turned on the rational basis test. The later case
128. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2840 (1976) (upholding
prior authorization for abortion although it was not required for other surgery); Bellotti
v. Baird, 96 S. Ct. 2857 (1976). But see Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 665 (D.
Conn. (1975), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 96 S. Ct. 3219 (1976) (No.
75-1440). In Norton, the court specifically invalidated the state's requirement of prior
authorization for first trimester abortions because they create "the sort of delay that the
Supreme Court found constitutionally repugnant in Doe v. Bolton." 408 F. Supp. at 665.
Prior authorization is a review method used by many states to control unnecessary serv-
ices. Kelmer, Promptness in the Delivery of Service Under Medicaid: The Misuse of
Prior Authorization Procedures, 9 CLEAINGHOUSE REv. 242 (1975).
129. 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated, 412 U.S. 925 (1973).
130. Id. at 500.
131. Id. at 500-01.
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of McRae v. Mathews'3 2 disapproved of such a classification under the
compelling interest test. McRae is not a case dealing with state restric-
tions on Medicaid. Rather, it is the case holding the Hyde amendment
unconstitutional, and the injunction resulting from the case is still
operating to suspend the effect of that amendment. Nevertheless,
McRae is good authority as to the constitutional limits of state action,
since the federal government can no more deprive persons of equal
protection than can state governments.
1 33
The McRae court noted that the Hyde amendment did not affect
nonindigent women but that "the needy, the wards of government,
would by this enactment, be denied the means to exercise their constitu-
tional right.' 3 4  Finding that the only reason for denial 135 of medical
assistance by the federal government was "because the woman has
chosen to exercise a constitutionally protected right,"'136 the court en-
joined the secretary of HEW from paying heed to the Hyde amendment.
The. classification between rich and poor in these cases resulted from
the fact that the government has chosen to subsidize medical care only
for poor people. Once having decided to supply medical care to this
class of people, the government cannot deny women in this class their
constitutional right to choose whether to bear children, absent a com-
pelling reason for doing so.
Due Process of Law: Unconstitutional Conditions
The "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine, deriving primarily
from the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, prohibits states
from conditioning the receipt of statutory entitlements upon the forfei-
ture of fundamental constitutional rights. This theory was well estab-
lished in a line of cases dating from Sherbert v. Verner, 3 7 wherein the
Supreme Court invalidated a state's refusal to provide unemployment
benefits to a woman whose religious beliefs forbade her to work on
Saturday. The Court there held that conditioning receipt of unemploy-
ment compensation on the beneficiary's agreement to work on Saturday
would require her to forfeit her first amendment right to free exercise of
religion and was therefore unconstitutional.
38
132. 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
133. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
134. 421 F. Supp. at 542.
135. As to whether medical assistance would in fact be denied see text accom-
panying notes 214-33 infra.
136. 421 F. Supp. at 542.
137. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
138. See also Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of
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The unconstitutional conditions doctrine, however, is easily articu-
lated in equal protection terms, as is illustrated by two recent Supreme
Court cases. In both Shapiro v. Thompson139 and Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County, 40 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality
of conditioning the receipt of welfare and indigent medical benefits
upon a lengthy period of residency. The court held in both instances
that states or counties could not withhold statutory benefits because
indigents had recently exercised their constitutional right to travel. Both
decisions did not mention the due process clause but purported to turn
on equal protection principles-illegal classifications discriminating
against indigents who had exercised a fundamental right.
None of the Medicaid abortion cases has used the Sherbert due
process reasoning. All the cases have found equal protection analysis
more convenient. The following language, however, from Roe v. Nor-
ton, ' 4 an equal protection argument, illustrates the potential for a due
process argument:
[W]hen Connecticut refuses to fund elective -abortions while fund-
ing therapeutic abortions and prenatal and postnatal care, it weighs
the choice of the pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her
constitutionally protected right to an elective abortion. Her choice
is affected not simply by the absence of payment for the abortion,
but by the availability of public funds for childbirth if she chooses
not to have the abortion. When the state thus infringes upon a
fundamental interest, it must assert a compelling state interest
that justifies the incursion.
142
As due process analysis adds nothing that cannot be achieved
under the equal protection clause, there is no need to dwell on it.
However, it is worth noting that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
is yet another way in which restrictive medicaid policies on abortion fail
to meet minimal constitutional standards.
The Meaning of "Medically Necessary" in the Abortion Context
In grasping for a rationale to vindicate restrictions on Medicaid
payment for abortion to cases where the procedure is necessary to
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956);
United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R., 282 U.S. 311 (1931); Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926); Comment, Another Look at
Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968).
139. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
140. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
141. 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Maher v. Roe,
96 S. Ct. 3219 (1976) (No. 75-1440).
142. Id. at 663-64.
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preserve maternal health or life, some states have relied on two sections
of the Medicaid law. One of these is section 1396a(a)(17). which
permits a state to "include reasonable standards . . . for determining
eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance . . . consistent with
the objectives of [Title XIX].' 143  The other section is the preamble to
the act, which arguably describes the act's objectives and requires states
to pay for medical assistance to those whose "income and resources are
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services."' 4  States
wishing to restrict Medicaid payments claim that abortions not necessary
to protect life or health fail to meet this standard. This argument raises
philosophical and legal questions about the meaning of the term "medi-
cally necessary."
As noted, states have generally defined "medically necessary" to
mean necessary to save life or prevent permanent impairment to health,
even though the Supreme Court specifically rejected such a definition in
Doe v. Bolton.145 The term may have several meanings-that intended
by Congress, that referred to in the medical community, or that required
by constitutional analysis. As courts have intermingled these different
definitions while giving great significance to the medical necessity issue, it
is important to analyze the term quite specifically. Because of Wade and
Bolton, the term "medically necessary" does not permit states to deny
payment for abortion. Medical necessity is a red herring issue that
states have raised to camouflage their philosophical opposition to fund-
ing the procedure.
Congressional intent in drafting the preamble to the Medicaid
statute is so ambiguous as to be meaningless140 and does not advance
143. 42 U.S.C § 1396a(a)(17) (Supp. V, 1975).
144. id. § 1396. One court has held that the preamble, not other parts of the law,
sets forth the objectives of the act. California Welfare Rights Org. v. Richardson, 348
F. Supp. 491, 496 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
145. 410 U.S. 179, 186, 191-92 (1973). See note 152 infra.
146. Congress did not explain what it meant by "medically necessary" as used in
the Medicaid statute's preamble. The placement of the words renders them ambiguous
at best. The preamble requires states to pay for medical care for persons who have in-
sufficient income and resources "to meet the costs of necessary medical services .... "
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (Supp. V, 1975). The term thus appears to modify only a person's
eligibility for Medicaid, not the types of medical assistance that states may provide under
program. In 1974 the United States District Court in Connecticut adopted this interpre-
tation of the preamble. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726, 728 (D. Conn. 1974), rev'd,
552 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975).
Regardless of whether Congress intended in 1965 to exclude Medicaid payment for
unnecessary medical care, it amended the statute in 1967 to include an express require-
ment that states implement systems to control the use of "unnecessary" services. Act
of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 237, 81 Stat. 911 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
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analysis of the term. A more useful definition of "medically necessary"
care is that used in the medical community: the care which is respon-
sive to the problem for which it is offered. 1 7  To apply this interpreta-
tion to any procedure, requires first that one identify the condition for
which care is offered and second that one determine whether the prof-
fered treatment is safe and efficacious for that condition.'48 If the
diagnosis is cancer, for example, treatment is clearly called for, and the
treatment offered must be one that is accepted by a significant part of
the medical community as effective and safe. With respect to abortion,
the diagnosis is pregnancy which is recognized as requiring medical
treatment, although it is not considered a disease or pathology. 149 Once
1396a(a)(30) (1970 & Supp. V, 1975)). Congress did not define the term "unneces-
sary," but it at least made clear that it intended to prohibit payment for unnecessary
medical services.
Since there is no evidence that Congress mandated a national definition, it is likely
that it expected states to develop standards for determining medical necessity on some
rational basis, probably in conjunction with the medical profession.
The professional standards review organization law, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-1 to -19
(Supp. V, 1975), delegates to local groups of physicians the function of setting standards
of medical necessity and applying them to Medicaid patients. Beginning with inpatient
hospital procedures in 1977, they will eventually review outpatient services as well. Cer-
tainly, the Medicaid statute gives wide latitude to states to design and administer their
programs. See Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 616 (3d Cir., 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.
3220 (1976) (No. 75-554). It is possible that Congress intended to permit states to
determine whether a given treatment is safe and efficacious as well as the types of medi-
cal conditions that they will cover. One court has interpreted section 1396a(a)(10)
(A) to permit states to determine the conditions which Medicaid will cover and to re-
quire them to pay for all appropriate medical alternatives a physician might choose to
treat each condition. Doe v. Beal, supra at 620-21. Because in Beal the state obviously
had chosen to cover pregnancy, the court did not have to determine what standards a
state could use in choosing whether to cover a particular condition. This is a loophole
in permitting state discretion. This analysis would allow the states to limit the services
for which they will pay. As will be seen, however, Wade and Bolton prohibit such state
restrictions on the choice of treatment for family planning or pregnancy.
147. See Bunker, Elective Hysterectomy: Pro and Con, 295 N. ENG. J. MEDICINE
267 (1976); cf. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG, 2D SESS., COST & QUALITY
OF HEALTH CARE: UNNECESSARY SURGERY 9 (1976) [hereinafter cited as UNNECESSARY
SURGERY]; Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y.
1972), vacated, 412 U.S. 925-26 (1973). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30) (Supp. V,
1975); 45 C.F.R. §§ 250.18-.19 (1976).
148. Obviously, the difficulty with this definition is in the second step: deciding
by what standard a treatment alternative is determined to be safe and efficacious.
Cancer treatment presents a prime example of the controversy over this issue. One
court has indicated that despite the FDA's finding that laetrile is not an effective cancer
treatment, a cancer patient was entitled to use it. The court based its decision on an
obtuse reading of Wade and Bolton. Rutherford v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208
(W.D. Okla. 1975).
149. Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072, 1082-83 (D.N.H. 1976); Klein v. Nassau
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it is established that pregnancy is a condition requiring medical atten-
tion, one must merely determine whether abortion is a safe and effica-
cious response to it at certain medically recognized stages.',1 Obviously
the answer must be yes, regardless of the reasons for the abortion, just as
prenatal care followed by delivery is also an accepted medical response
to pregnancy. Neither choice can be considered unnecessary, despite
the existence of alternative forms of medical intervention and despite the
fact that the treatments produce different results-a child or no child.
Most forms of treatment for a given condition are designed to produce
the same result, which may explain why there is such reluctance to apply
this analysis to the meaning of "medically necessary" in the context of
the abortion issue. Viewed as medical care for the woman patient, both
abortion and delivery do produce the same result-a safe termination of
the pregnant condition. An analogous condition might be kidney dis-
ease, where the choice of treatment is transplant or dialysis. These
treatments produce significantly different outcomes with varying conse-
quences and effects on the patient's lifestyle as well as his or her physical
health. Some form of medical treatment for kidney disease is obviously
necessary; the choice of treatment is determined by several factors, such
as the patient's ability to accept a transplant and the risk of transplant
versus dialysis.
Philosophically, this medical community analysis may sweep too
broadly in the Medicaid context, since it would justify providing cosmet-
ic surgery, if, for example, it was necessary to foster mental or emotional
health. Yet there may be acceptable policy reasons for not requiring
states to pay for such care. Doe v. Beal held that the Medicaid statute
permits states to limit the medical conditions for which treatment will be
provided.1"1  In any case, this question need not be faced in the
Medicaid abortion cases, as the constitutional analysis of Wade and
Bolton does not prohibit a state from limiting choice of treatment for
conditions other than pregnancy.
County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 500-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated, 412 U.S.
925-26 (1973). See also Roe v. Ferguson, 389 F. Supp. 387, 392 (S.D. Ohio 1974),
rev'd, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975).
150. The Supreme Court recently acknowledged that states can regulate the
methods of abortion to safeguard the mother's health. But in so doing the Court invali-
dated a Missouri law prohibiting use of the saline amniocentisis method because, among
other reasons it is the prevalent (68%-80%) method of abortion after the first tri-
mester and because no alternatives are generally available. Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2845 (1976).
151. 523 F.2d 611, 620-21 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976)
(No. 75-554). See also Legion v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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The Supreme Court indirectly considered the issue of what consti-
tutes a medically necessary abortion in Doe v. Bolton, where it upheld a
section of a Georgia statute making it illegal for a physician to perform
an abortion unless, in his "best clinical judgment," it is "necessary. ' 15"
The Court assumed that the physician would base the decision to abort
on physical, emotional, psychological, and familial factors, as well as on
a consideration of the woman's age. 153 By adopting this approach, the
Court seems to have accepted the proposition that there are "medically
unnecessary" abortions, apparently where the factors noted above are
absent.
In contrast, the Court also made very clear in Roe v. Wade that, at
least during the first trimester
the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to
determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical
judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that
decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abor-
tion free of interference by the State.' 54
Thus, at least during the first trimester, an abortion is medically
necessary for an individual patient whenever the physician says it is.
Unethical physicians are left to the discipline of their licensing
boards. 1 5 This analysis of the medical necessity issue disposes of the
152. 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973). The statute had originally provided that the
doctor determine that abortion was necessary to save life or health, was necessary be-
cause the fetus was physically or mentally defective, or was necessary because pregnancy
resulted from rape. See id. at 202. The district court in Georgia deleted the limitations
of the reasons which could cause an abortion to be necessary, but it let the statute con-
tinue to require a general determination of necessity. Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048
(N.D. Ga. 1970).
153. Id. While this assumption may not be justified with respect to the many surgi-
cal procedures which have been performed unnecessarily in the United States, there are
distinctions between abortions and other types of surgery which suggest that physicians
would not perform abortions unnecessarily. It should be noted, however, that there are
documented instances of abortion mills providing false pregnancy test results to nonpreg-
nant women and purporting to abort them. Los Angeles Times, July 21, 1976, at 3,
col. 6. When a patient is told she requires gall bladder surgery or a hysterectomy, she
usually has no personal knowledge about whether her gall bladder or uterus must be re-
moved to preserve her physical health. Generally, however, when pregnancy is con-
firmed, the patient knows whether or not she wishes to terminate her pregnancy by
abortion; this operation requires a decision involving social, psychological, and emotional
factors as well as physical factors. It is undoubtedly rare that a physician convinces
a patient against her judgment to abort a confirmed pregnancy. More frequently a phy-
sician convinces a patient to undergo other types of surgery which may often prove un-
necessary-that is, surgery performed only for the physician's own financial or profes-
sional interest. Perhaps this is the reason that the Supreme Court gave wide latitude
to the physician's decision in advising a patient whether to have an abortion.
154. 410 U.S. at 163.
155. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973).
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Medicaid abortion problem since any time a physician decides in the first
trimester that abortion is in the patient's best interest, it is "necessary"
by the Court's definition.
This approach, however, is somewhat unsatisfactory because of its
circular reasoning, i.e., abortions are "necessary" if the doctor so con-
cludes in light of physical, emotional, psychological, and familial fac-
tors, and the right to privacy precludes any examination of that conclu-
sion. A more direct approach to the problem is available. This
approach would recognize that the question of medical necessity arises
at the time the condition is discovered. If the condition is one that by
its nature may be alleviated by medical attention, then medical care is
necessary for this reason alone, regardless of the choices of treatment
available. When pregnancy is confirmed, for instance, a condition is
presented which requires medical treatment. The physical, psychologi-
cal, emotional, and familial factors enumerated by the Supreme Court for
the physician's consideration may or may not determine the choice among
"necessary" treatments, but they do not determine whether the condition
of pregnancy requires any "necessary" treatment in the first place.
This postulated approach reaches the same result on the Medicaid
abortion question as the analysis derived from Bolton. It is, however,
less subjective than the Court's approach because it permits one to
determine generally whether a condition requires medical care and
whether a given treatment is responsive to that condition. The Court's
approach in Bolton would require an inquiry into whether a proffered
treatment is appropriate to an individual patient, an inquiry that is itself
short-circuited since the state cannot interfere in the doctor-patient
decision to have an abortion. Furthermore, this suggested analysis
comports with the Wade-Bolton protection of choice between medical
alternatives by pregnant women. The recognition of such a choice
presupposes that the Supreme Court views pregnancy as a condition
requiring medical treatment and abortion as one of the several alterna-
tive forms of medical treatment.
Under either method of analysis, it would seem that the medical
necessity issue is spurious. The question of "medical necessity" is
closed once pregnancy is confirmed. Perhaps states may constitutional-
ly limit a physician's general choice of treatment under Medicaid, but
they may not do so when the choice involves pregnancy or family
planning. States could, for example, refuse to pay for cosmetic surgery,
which might be a physician's preferred choice of treatment for an
emotional condition that a state might otherwise cover. But the physi-
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cian's choice of treatment for pregnancy is protected from interference
by the Constitution.
Courts and litigants have not acknowledged that there is no real
medical necessity issue and have continued to give substance to the term
in the Medicaid abortion context. For intance, in his amicus curiae
brief to the Supreme Court on the state's petition for certiorari in Doe v.
Beal,1"" the solicitor general wrestled with this problem but did not
confront the real issue when he defined "medically indicated" to include
the factors specified by the Court in Bolton. He assumed, as the Court
had done, that any physician certifying the medical necessity of an
abortion would use those factors in making this decision. However, the
solicitor general failed to draw the obvious conclusion from these
assumptions: that there are no abortions which would not be miedical-
ly necessary, aside from those where a physician actually acts against a
patient's interest or where the patient is not pregnant.
157
156. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae for Certiorari, Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d
611 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976) (No. 75-554).
157. In his brief, the solicitor general made the suggestion that, in order to insure
that a doctor was considering all the Bolton necessity factors before declaring an abor-
tion necessary, a state could require the doctor to execute a certificate of medical neces-
sity. There is dangerous appeal in this suggestion Such a requirement is meaningless
in light of Roe v. Wade, which forbids state interference in the doctor-patient choice
to abort in the first trimester See text accompanying note 154 supra. In fact, it is
pernicious because it is confusing to administrators and physicians. Some physicians
have their own interpretation of when a procedure is medically necessary, such as when
care is compelled by a threat to life or health; yet they may prefer to apply a dif-
ferent standard to determine whether an abortion is in their patients' best interest.
Thus, when asked for his definition of medical necessity, Dr. Benjamin Munson,
attending physician to Jane Doe, plaintiff in Doe v. Westby, testified, "Well, I would
say a 'necessary medical procedure'-I hardly ever use the word. I would say, advisable,
beneficial. Anything that's necessary without which a person will die, of course that's
necessary. Anything without which a person will suffer a serious embarrassment of
health, I think that could be called necessary. Beyond that, I suppose very few things
are really necessary." Deposition of H. Benjamin Munson, M.D., June 7, 1974, at 13,
Doe v. Westby, 402 F. Supp. 140 (D.S.D. 1975) (3-judge ct.), appeal docketed, 45
U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 27, 1976) (No. 75-813). With respect to the "necessity" of
an abortion for Jane Doe, Dr. Munson said, "I think 'necessary' is too strong of a word.
I wouldn't say necessary, except in terms of preserving the reasonable health that she
had, preserving it from depletion and overtiredness and the kind of things that would
prejudice a person's general vitality." Id. at 17.
Permitting states to require a certificate of medical necessity as a condition to Medi-
caid abortion payment may interfere with the physician-patient relationship and may im-
pair the physician's ability to prescribe the treatment of choice. Both of these interests
were guaranteed protection in Wade and Bolton. Other measures are available by which
states can protect against the only types of "unnecessary" abortions implicitly recognized
by the Court in Wade and Bolton-that is, those abortions where the patient is not ac-
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The first court to examine the argument that a state could exclude
payment for abortions deemed not medically necessary was the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in Klein v.
Nassau County Medical Center," 8 a case which arose before Wade and
Bolton. The Klein court specifically answered the contention that
abortions not necessary to preserve life or health may nonetheless fit
within the Medicaid law's scheme of medical necessity:
Pregnancy is a condition which in today's society is universally
treated as requiring medical care, prenatal, obstetrical and post-
partum care, and undeniably it is provided under the Medicaid
program as "necessary" medical assistance although pregnancy is
not an abnormal condition, nor does the medical assistance in
child birth "cure" it. Medical assistance for abortion is not less"necessary" because an election to bear the child would obviate
that medical assistance and require instead other, more extensive
and more expensive medical assistance.159
Although the Klein decision, when appealed to the Supreme Court,
was vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Bolton and
Wade,' the court's reasoning was so sound that it has been universally
accepted. It has, in fact, provided the underpinning of most of the
Medicaid abortion decisions to follow.'
In Doe v. Wohlgemuth6 2 a three-judge district court panel in
Pennsylvania swiftly rejected the argument that the Medicaid statute
requires payment for abortion. In examining plaintiffs' constitutional
tually pregnant or where the physician acts contrary to the patient's express will or her
informed judgment. To avoid the problem of abortional acts inflicted upon women who
are, for whatever reason, misdiagnosed as pregnant, states can and do license clinics,
laboratories, and physicians. To assure that the patient has freely participated in and
concurs with the physician's decision, a state may require written consent, as was sanc-
tioned in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2839-40 (1976). By adopting
such protective devices a state could guard its legitimate interest in insuring that funds
are not used to pay for fraudulent procedures or for those to which the woman did not
actually consent. This arrangement would not unduly impair the physician-patient rela-
tionship as would the certificate of medical necessity.
158. 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated, 412 U.S. 925-26 (1973).
159. Id. at 500.
160. 412 U.S. 925-26 (1973).
161. See Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 618 (3d. Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.
3220 (1976) (No. 75-554); Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 937 (2d Cir.), on remand,
408 F. Supp. 660, 664 (D. Conn. 1975), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 96
S. Ct. 3219 (1976) (No. 75-1440); Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279, 282 (6th Cir. 1975);
Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 1974); Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072,
1081 (D.N.H. 1976).
162. 376 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1974), modified, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976) (No. 75-554). See notes 113, 151 & accompanying
text supra, notes 169, 189 & accompanying text infra.
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arguments, however, the court expressly held unconstitutional the state's
limitation of Medicaid funds to "necessary" abortions as defined by the
state of Pennsylvania. The court cited Roe v. Wade in support of its
finding that abortion is by definition a necessary medical service, be-
cause "it may prevent specific and direct harm which is medically
diagnosable (e.g., psychological harm), may protect the woman's future
mental and physical health, and may prevent the distress associated with
the unwanted pregnancy and child."'
'1 3
The Third Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the
Medicaid statute does require the state to pay for abortions.6 Without
dwelling on the problem of medical necessity, the court did find that a
state is free to define medical conditions for which treatment is neces-
sary; once having defined them, however, the state must pay for all
appropriate medical alternatives that a physician might choose to treat
those conditions.'8 5
Statutory Arguments Supporting State Funding of Abortions
As noted, the Hyde amendment, being a provision governing the
expenditures of funds in an appropriations bill, did not amend the
Medicaid statute, although it clearly illustrates current congressional
feeling on the question of federal funding of abortions. These senti-
ments, however, do not necessarily establish the intent of Congress in
enacting Title XIX.166 Thus, statutory arguments relating to abortion
funding will survive whether or not the Hyde amendment is invalidated,
and they will, therefore, be briefly explored.
Comparability Requirements of the Medicaid Statute
The Third Circuit in Doe v. Beal'116 7 developed a creative interpre-
tation of the Medicaid statute by finding that the so-called comparability
section of the federal law'68 requires equitable treatment of Medicaid
recipients whose physicians choose different modes of therapy for the
same condition. Examining Medicaid's statutory language and purposes,
the court determined that states have considerable latitude in design-
163. 376 F. Supp. at 190, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
164. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220
(1976) (No. 75-554).
165. Id. at 621-22.
166. Doe v. Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 865 (D.N.J. 1976).
167. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220
(1976) (No. 75-554).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)-(C) (Supp. V, 1975).
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ing their Medicaid programs to meet both beneficiary needs and state
fiscal requirements;' 19 they must, however, exercise their discretion
within the statutory limitations.170  Thus, states may define the types of
medical conditions the treatment of which they will subsidize; but once
having established those conditions, they may not prescribe the methods
for treating them. Such a decision rests exclusively with the attending
physician.1
7 1
The court reached this conclusion by interpreting sections
1396a(a) (10) (B) and (C) of the statute which dictate equality among
Medicaid recipients by requiring that
the medical assistance made available [to the categorically and the
medically needy] shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope
than the medical assistance made available to any other such
individual .... 172
The court said that restricting payment for abortion forces "pregnant
women to use the least voluntary method of treatment, while not impos-
ing a similar requirement on other persons who qualify for aid.'
7 :
Thus, the court interpreted the Medicaid statute to include its own
"equal protection clause." This analogy is particularly striking in view
of the court's recognition that the state could impose some limits on
modes of treatment (such as requiring generic drugs to be prescribed or
services to be performed in hospitals) but that such restrictions had to
be reasonable.'17 This analysis is identical to that used by courts in
equal protection cases when they seek a rational basis for a state's
discrimination between two similarly situated groups.
The Beal court examined the state's suggested rationales for limit-
ing Medicaid abortion payments to procedures necessary to preserve life
or health and for imposing preconditions upon the abortion proce-
dure. 1 5 It found that fiscal savings were not a satisfactory reason for
refusing payment since abortion is usually the cheapest method of
treating pregnancy.17  Nor was protection of the mother's life a justifi-
cation for the limitations, since early abortion is conceded to be safer
than childbirth.
77
169. 523 F.2d at 616.
170. Id. at 616-19.
171. Id. at 620.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (B) (Supp. V, 1975).
173. 523 F.2d at 619.
174. Id. at 621.
175. Id. at 621-22.
176. Id. at 622.
177. Id.
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Several other courts have adopted the Third Circuit's approach, 17
and none has specifically rejected it, although courts have, in a general
way, denied that Medicaid mandates coverage of elective abortions. 7 9
In addition to disposing of the Medicaid abortion question without
resorting to the Constitution,18 0 the analysis has broad implications for
Medicaid litigation generally, since it permits raising statutory argu-
ments which are similar to those resorted to in constitutional chal-
lenges.18 1  This is important because the Supreme Court has significant-
ly retreated from its earlier liberal position on equal protection, lessening
the chances that a constitutional analysis can successfully be applied.1
8 2
Amount, Scope, and Duration Regulation
As discussed above, 83 the Medicaid statute does not define the
extent to which states may limit Medicaid services; however, an HEW
regulation does prescribe boundaries for state restrictions on services.
According to this provision, services cannot be so circumscribed that
they fail to achieve their purpose,8 4 and mandatory services cannot be
so limited that they exclude from treatment an illness, condition, or
diagnosis. 8 5 States covering only abortions necessary to protect life or
health arguably violate both of these regulatory standards.
178. See Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072, 1082-84 (D.N.H. 1976); Doe v.
Westby, 402 F. Supp. 140, 143 (D.S.D. 1975), (3-judge ct.), appeal docketed, 45
U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 27, 1976) (No. 75-813); Doe v. Myatt, No. 43-74-48
(D.N.D., Oct. 30, 1975).
179. Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'g 380 F. Supp. 726 (D.
Conn. 1974); Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975). See also Doe v. Rose,
499 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 1974). Norton and Ferguson turned on the theory
that Congress could not have intended to force states into elective abortion coverage,
since in 1965, when Title XIX was passed, most states had criminal laws against such
abortions. The Beal court took issue with this analysis: "It is impossible to believe that
in enacting Title XIX Congress intended to freeze the medical services available to re-
cipients at those which were legal in 1965. Congress surely intended Medicaid to pay
for drugs not legally marketable under the FDA's regulations in 1965 which are subse-
quently found marketable. We can see no reason why the same analysis should not
apply to the Supreme Court's legalization of elective abortions in 1973." 523 F.2d at
622-23.
180. The Supreme Court prefers that courts decide cases on the basis of statutory,
rather than constitutional, arguments whenever possible. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.
528, 543 (1974). Doe v. Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D. 1974), vacated, 420 U.S.
968 (1975) (remanded for consideration of statutory issue first).
181. See, e.g., White v. Beal, 413 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
182. See notes 38-40 & accompanying text supra.
183. See notes 66-69 & accompanying text supra.
184. 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a) (5) (i) (1976).
185. Id.
March 1977]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Abortions are performed by physicians, often in hospitals, as fami-
ly planning services. Thus, they involve three mandatory Medicaid
services. To determine whether limitations on payment for abortion
run counter to the "purpose" standard of the Medicaid regulations, one
must first analyze the purpose of each service in question and then
examine the abortion limitation to see whether it accomplishes that
purpose. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania applied this approach in White v. Beal,'86 where plaintiffs
challenged Pennsylvania's Medicaid policy of paying for eyeglasses for
patients with eye diseases but not for persons with refractive visual
errors, such as nearsightedness, farsightedness, or astigmatism. The
court in that case sought a statement of the purpose of providing
eyeglasses; finding none in the Medicaid statute, the court used the
regulatory definition of eyeglasses as "lenses .. . to aid or improve
vision.' 18T Since plaintiffs had established that supplying eyeglasses to
persons with eye disease almost never aids or improves vision, whereas
giving lenses to persons with refractive visual errors almost always does,
the court concluded that the state's limited payment policy did not
achieve the purpose of the service.188
Application of this "purpose" analysis to Medicaid abortion limita-
tions is hampered by the fact that it may be difficult to establish a
workable standard of purpose for physician or hospital services. The
regulatory definitions of physician and hospital services are so broad as
to be useless in this regard. This was the conclusion of the Third
Circuit in Doe v. Beal'8 9 when it examined the Medicaid law for
definitions of services in a slightly different context. However, because
family planning services seem inherently to have a more specific defini-
tion, both in public health terms and in the federal regulations, it is
possible to define the purposes of such services-for example, spacing
children, controlling family size, and avoiding genetic defects. 190 Lim-
iting availability of abortions to those necessary to preserve life or health
would thwart these goals, thus failing to meet the purpose standard.
Whether this approach would have practical viability depends in large
part upon the content of HEW's final family planning abortion regula-
tions, which have yet to be published. 19'
186. 413 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
187. Id. at 1153, quoting 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(b)(12)(iv) (1976).
188. Id. at 1153-54.
189. 523 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976) (No.
75-554).
190. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 92-1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1972).
191. See text accompanying notes 207-09 infra.
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The court in White v. Beal also found that the Pennsylvania limits
on Medicaid payments for eyeglasses ran afoul of the "scope" standard
in the "amount, scope and duration" proviso of the Medicaid regulations
by arbitrarily refusing services because of a diagnosis, illness, or condi-
tion.1 2 Although this standard applies only to the required services for
the categorically needy, the court found that once the state chose to
cover services for the medically needy,'93 optional services' 94 such as
providing eyeglasses became "required" services for the categorically
needy within the meaning of the regulation. The court then held that
providing eyeglasses to persons with incurable eye disease, while deny-
ing them to persons with correctable visual defects, unnecessarily limited
required services merely because of a diagnosis of refractive impair-
ment. 95
Whatever the difficulties in using the "purpose" standard to ana-
lyze Medicaid abortion limitations, the "scope" standard clearly applies
to invalidate programs that restrict payment for abortions to those
necessary to preserve or protect life. Physician, hospital, and family
planning services are all mandatory services to which the standard
obviously applies. Restrictive Medicaid policies deny abortions to
healthy women for whom pregnancy is not a health or -life threatening
condition. Such policies are arbitrary in view of the Supreme Court's
holding in Wade and Bolton that abortion is a matter of choice and may
not be limited to those procedures necessary to preserve maternal life or
health.
The federal district court in New Hampshire applied this analysis
in Coe v. Hooker'96 to invalidate New Hampshire's limitations on Medi-
caid abortions. Finding that the policy arbitrarily excluded healthy
women from receiving abortion services, the court disposed of the state's
argument that the amount, scope, and duration regulation permitted the
restriction by providing: "Appropriate limits may be placed on serv-
ices based on such criteria as medical necessity or those contained in
utilization or medical review procedures."' 97  In holding that the state
192. 413 F. Supp. 1141, 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1976), interpreting 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a)
(5)(i) (1976). Relying on the regulatory definition of eyeglasses as a visual aid the
court rejected the state's attempt to define the condition as eye pathology. 413 F. Supp.
at 1154.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (B) (Supp. V, 1975).
194. Id. § 1396d(a)(12).
195. 413 F. Supp. at 1154-55. The court relied heavily on Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d
611 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976) (No. 75-554).
196 406 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.H. 1976). See notes 201-02 & accompanying text
infra.
197. 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a)(5)(i) (1976).
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could not justify limiting abortion benefits by characterizing them as not
medically necessary, the court did more than dismiss the medical neces-
sity argument based by the state on Wade and Bolton. It also found that
the state's definition of medical necessity which only included abortions
for life or health threatening conditions
create[d] an irrebuttable presumption that an abortion performed
on a woman whose pregnant condition does not pose a diagnosable
physical health hazard is not "necessary.'
198
Citing Weinberger v. Salft, I the court held that such a presumption
was not rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective because the
state's purpose in limiting abortion payments was moral and hence
inappropriate. °0
Best Interest of the Recipients
In overturning state restrictions on Medicaid abortions, courts have
also relied on the federal standard requiring that state Medicaid pro-
grams be administered in "the best interests of the recipients .... ,201
The three-judge panel in Coe v. Hooker concluded that New Hamp-
shire's abortion restrictions did not meet that requirement. As the court
noted, first trimester abortions are conceded to be safer than full term
delivery, and the persons most capable of determining whether an
abortion is in a particular woman's best interest are the woman and her
physician-not the state.2"2
Other Statutory Arguments
Plaintiffs in several cases have argued that the regulatory defini-
tions of physician and family planning services implicitly include abor-
tions. These theories, however, have not succeeded. 3 Furthermore, it
198. 406 F. Supp. at 1085.
199. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
200. Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 1974).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19) (1970).
202. 406 F. Supp. at 1080-81. See note 196 & accompanying text supra.
203. "Again, the argument proves too much. Elective cosmetic surgery, for example,
is within the licensed practice of medicine in most, if not all, states. If the plaintiffs
were correct, the state would be required to pay for such procedures, at the expense,
perhaps, of many pressing medical needs of the poor. While § 1903(e) of the original
Act may have required the eventual funding of such procedures, its repeal indicates that
Congress has no present intention of funding every procedure which falls within the
legal practice of medicine. The states are given broad discretion to tailor their programs
to their particular needs, and are required to economize and to fund only necessary medi-
cal expenses." Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.
3220 (1976) (No. 75-554).
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has already been shown 20 4 that when Congress provided for family plan-
ning services under Medicaid, it arguably intended to cover elective
abortions, since in other family planning legislation, Congress took care
to exclude abortions explicitly. 20° Antiabortion advocates could plausi-
bly argue that Congress, by enacting the Hyde amendment, showed that
it indeed had the intent of excluding elective abortions when it enacted
Medicaid. This argument need not be accepted, since Congress has left
its original intent to require state coverage of abortions intact. The
Hyde amendment purports to affect nothing more than the funds in the
1977 HEW-Labor appropriations bill, and there is no reason to extend
its effect beyond those limited confines.
Apart from congressional intent in providing for family planning
services as part of states' responsibility under Medicaid, one may also
consider the standard practice of public health experts in defining the
scope of such practices. Public health and medical experts will agree
that abortion is a method of family planning, but not all concur in the
assertion that it is an integral part of a family planning program, as it is
obviously a rather extreme method of birth control. Nevertheless, a
relatively uniform consensus among health care professionals holds that
family planning services include such specific techniques as contracep-
tion, sterilization, treatment for infertility, and also abortion.206 Abor-
tion serves as a backup method of handling contraceptive failure and as
a means of meeting family planning needs where contraception has not
been used or provided. It is therefore arguably a necessary element in a
comprehensive system of family planning services.
In developing its regulations to implement the 1972 family plan-
ning amendment to Medicaid, HEW faced the controversy surround-
ing abortion. In its proposed regulations of June 13, 1973,20 for
purposes of defining the scope of family planning services, the depart-
ment, consistent with its policy of allowing the states to have complete
discretion in deciding whether or not to cover abortions under Medi-
caid,208 made no reference to abortion. After considerable controversy
in 1974, HEW published a revised proposal which would have excluded
204. See text accompanying notes 72-76 supra.
205. No congressional materials reveal a clear legislative intent on this matter. See
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(5) (Supp. V, 1975); S. REP. No. 92-1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
297 (1972).
206. See Wallace, Goldstine, Gold & Oglesby, A Study of Title XIX Coverage of
Abortion, 1972 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 116-20.
207. 38 Fed. Reg. 15582 (1973).
208. See note 156 supra.
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abortion from the family planning service definition. 2°0  Final regula-
tions are not yet published.
The Congressional Refusal To Provide Funds
for Elective Abortions
Because Medicaid is a state administered program, courts have
applied constitutional standards to hold that states may not restrict the
patient's and physician's choice of treatment for pregnancy. Before the
passage of the Hyde amendment, HEW took the position that federal
funds were available for abortion if the states chose to provide the
service.21° Courts never faced the question of how the availability of
federal funds related to the constitutional obligations of states under
Medicaid to pay for elective abortions. This is a question inextricably
bound up in the question of the Hyde amendment's constitutionality,
and it is perhaps best to discuss these questions together.
Two reported decisions on the constitutionality of the Hyde amend-
ment appeared soon after the Hyde amendment became law on October
1, 1976. The first decision, Doe v. Mathews,2 1' was handed down that
same day. The decision did no more than deny on procedural
grounds21 2 a temporary restraining order against HEW to enjoin the
209. 39 Fed. Reg. 42919-20 (1974).
210. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae for Certiorari, Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d
611 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976) (No. 75-554). See also Roe
v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1975).
211. 420 F. Supp. 865 (D.N.J. 1976).
212. Judge Biunno noted that a temporary restraining order against the secretary
of HEW would be pointless since it is the secretary of the treasury who withdraws
the funds in the HEW-Labor appropriations bill. Since the requested TRO was directed
only at HEW, the secretary of the treasury would continue to be bound by the Hyde
amendment. But see 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a) (Supp. V, 1975) ("From the sums appro-
priated therefor, the Secretary [of HEW] shall pay to each State . . ."). In addition,
the court expressed doubt that a TRO could be issued to compel the secretary of the
treasury to disburse funds, since the Constitution provides: "No Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law ....... U.S.
CONST. art I, § 9. The court did express a willingness to consider enjoining the expen-
diture of any Medicaid funds to coerce Congress into appropriating funds for elective
abortions. However, Judge Biunno declined to take such a drastic step in a TRO with-
out the presence of all the parties who would be adversely affected. The court was also
unwilling to issue a TRO on the grounds that it would violate the equal protection rights
of some of the plaintiffs, since the court had no facts upon which to analyze the claim.
In the meantime, Judge Biunno urged that women eligible for Medicaid avoid pregnancy.
Judge Biunno also noted that the state of New Jersey had been enjoined from
denying compensation for elective abortions. The state was not made a party to the
action, and therefore Judge Biunno declined to rule whether the Hyde amendment was
cause for the state to ask that the injunction against it be lifted so that the state could
resume its antiabortion policy.
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enforcement of the Hyde amendment pending a further hearing on its
constitutionality. As a result, the court merely raised issues without
resolving them.213
The second decision, McRae v. Mathews, 214 resulted in a nation-
wide injunction prohibiting the secretary of HEW from giving effect to
the Hyde amendment and, in essence, compelling the disbursement of
federal funds to the states to cover elective abortions under Medicaid. As
of this writing, this injunction is still in effect, and states are receiving
funds for their expenses relating to elective abortions.
The plaintiffs in McRae included the class of pregnant Medicaid
beneficiaries, Planned Parenthood, representing the same group, and the
New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, which provides
health services to New York City residents through sixteen municipal
hospitals.2 15  HEW presented many objections to the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, the most difficult being the claim that no plain-
tiff has been injured by the Hyde amendment. The rationale suggested
by HEW for the absence of harm to plaintiffs in McRae was that under
state law and under the fourteenth amendment, states would continue to
provide the elective abortion services of which plaintiffs claimed they
would be deprived by the Hyde amendment.2 16  This claim struck at the
plaintiffs' cause of action in three ways. First, plaintiffs had to show
irreparable harm and probable success on the merits to receive a prelim-
inary injunction.21 7 Second, plaintiffs had to establish standing to sue
on the question of the Hyde amendment, which presupposes that they
had been harmed by it.2 1  Third, the plaintiffs had to show that
213. Later in the month, in an unreported decision, Judge Sirica refused to enjoin
HEW from enforcing the Hyde amendment. Doe v. Mathews, Civil No. 76-1835
(D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1976). Judge Sirica noted that the various jurisdictions supplying the
plaintiffs medical services had not yet changed their laws to deny the plaintiffs elective
abortions. Until that happened, reasoned the court, none of the plaintiffs had standing
to sue.
214. 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
215. Id. at 535-36.
216. Id. at 537-38. Not mentioned was the fact that Title XIX itself might require
these abortions, in spite of the Hyde amendment, which only affects how the federal
government will participate in the funding of Medicaid. See notes 166-82 & accompany-
ing text supra.
217. FED. R. Civ. P. 65. One of the harms justifying a preliminary injunction in
McRae v. Mathews was that physicians upon whom Medicaid eligibles depend to provide
medical care would be confused by the uncertainty caused by the Hyde amendment and
might be deterred from performing abortions.
218. The doctrine of standing is in a state of flux, and its complexities are well
beyond the scope of this article. It is worth noting, in regard to the McRae case, that
recent Supreme Court pronouncements require allegations of "concrete facts demon-
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because they were deprived of Medicaid benefits, they were persons
denied equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion.
Judge Dooling found that the plaintiffs had in fact been harmed.
According to his analysis, Medicaid is largely a federal program admin-
istered with the fiscal and organizational assistance of the states. The
federal government was thus characterized as having assumed a "meas-
ure of responsibility already to the needy . . . when in Title XIX of the
Social Security Act, it laid down the parameters of medical assistance for
the needy of the nation."2 19 From this, according to the court:
It follows that withdrawal of reimbursement for elective abortions
lawfully performed by licensed providers is directly injurious both
to the providers and to the indigent women who seek the abortional
services. . . . It may well be that the state could find funds to
assume the responsibility for making the payments, or that private
charity could supply the abortional services. But that is no more
than to say that if the national government unconstitutionally denies
an entitlement, catastrophe need not ensue. The answer is that
action if unconstitutional, is not tolerable, and is not made toler-
able by the consideration that others may make good the harms
inflicted by the unconstitutional default. The manifest fact is
that [the Hyde amendment] is calculated to stop the provision of
abortional services from public funds; it is not calculated to
shift the burden of providing this medical assistance to the states.
22 0
Whether the plaintiffs in McRae and others similarly situated are
actually harmed when the federal government denies reimbursement to
the states for the cost of elective abortion services is the question that
will determine the constitutionality of the Hyde amendment. It is
actually a close question and its answer involves considerable uncertain-
ty.
There is substantial appeal in HEW's argument that whether or not
the federal government withholds reimbursement for elective abortions,
the states will still be obliged to provide the service to their beneficiaries
strating that the challenged practices harm [the plaintiff], and that he would person-
ally benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention. Absent the necessary alle-
gations of demonstrable, particularized injury, there can be no confidence of 'a real need
to exercise the power of judicial review' or that relief can be framed 'no broader than
required by the precise facts to which the court's ruling could be applied.'" Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975). See also Singleton v. Wulff, 96 S. Ct. 2868, 2873-
74 (1976); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976). The
implication of these cases is that, absent a showing of "harm" caused by the Hyde
amendment, the plaintiffs in McRae would not have standing to sue the secretary of
HEW to enjoin the enforcement of that law.
219. 421 F. Supp. at 538.
220. Id.
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to the same extent that other pregnancy services are provided to other
beneficiaries. States cannot, consistent with the equal protection clause,
single out those who wish to exercise their constitutional right to choose
abortion over childbirth and treat them differently from other pregnant
women, unless they have a compelling reason for doing so. It is
doubtful whether the states could argue that they would save funds if
they withheld abortions in favor of expensive alternatives for which they
could get federal reimbursement. But even if they could, saving public
funds does not constitute a compelling state interest justifying infringe-
ment of a constitutional right.
2 21
In addition, the method of Medicaid reimbursement suggests that
under current procedures Medicaid beneficiaries will continue to receive
elective abortion services from the state in spite of the Hyde amendment.
Title XIX calls for the state to reimburse providers according to a state
plan approved by the secretary of HEW.222 After considering data
from state reports and other sources, the secretary of HEW estimates the
federal share of state expenses for the upcoming fiscal quarter. Based
on this estimate, the secretary advances appropriate sums of federal
money to the states on an installment basis, adjusting payments to
account for overpayments or underpayments from the previous quar-
ter.22 3 Title XIX specifies the expenses in which the federal government
will share.2 4  Of course, a state is free to cover services which are not
reimbursable under Medicaid. The Hyde amendment bars the secretary
of HEW from disbursing funds to the states to cover elective abortion
costs. Thus, the Hyde amendment effectively places elective abortions
among the class of nonreimbursable services. The equal protection
clause, Title XIX, and HEW's regulations may well require the states to
provide elective abortions, but this alone does not make elective abor-
tions federally reimbursable.
Further implications can be drawn from the fact that the state
compensates the provider of elective abortions before it is itself reim-
bursed. If a state decides it wants to eliminate coverage of elective
abortions because of the Hyde amendment, or if it wishes to cover only
221. "Of course, a State cannot justify on the basis of fiscal integrity a regulation
which would exclude a woman from Medical Assistance reimbursement because she has
decided to exercise a constitutional right related to the decision as to whether to bear
or beget a child." Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 188 (W.D. Pa. 1974),
modified sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.
3220 (1976) (No. 75-554). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
222. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(b), 1396b(a) (1970 & Supp. V, 1975).
223. See id. § 1396b(a).
224. Id. §§ 1396b, 1396c.
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its share of the cost, representing its pre-Hyde amendment share in the
service, the state, not the federal government, is the institution which
takes the affirmative action to create the illegal classifications between
Medicaid beneficiaries. If the state does nothing, providers continue to
be reimbursed for elective abortions. Only if the state changes its laws
or policies will denial of equal protection result. That the federal
government "encouraged" the illegal action is irrelevant, since the feder-
al government is without power to authorize the states to violate the
Constitution. 
2 25
Under this reasoning, Medicaid beneficiaries are not directly
harmed by the Hyde amendment. Since they .have the right to receive
elective abortions from the states, they are not being deprived of equal
protection of the laws.226  Absent any but the most speculative harm,
they have no standing to challenge the Hyde amendment.22 7 They also
would be unable to establish the grounds for a preliminary injunction
against the federal government, since it is not clear that they would
prevail on the merits or that they are being irreparably harmed. This
reasoning also comports with the presumption that congressional legisla-
tion is constitutional and ought to be interpreted in such a way as to
preserve its validity.
2 28
This reasoning is far from inevitable, and grounding an important
ruling of constitutional law on the nature of accounting procedures
seems quite unsatisfactory. A finding that the Hyde amendment is
constitutional also means that the actions of the federal government,
which created the illegal classification, are judicially approved while the
natural response of the states-cutting back funding because of the
withdrawal of federal funds-is denounced as unconstitutional.
225. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969). Shapiro dealt with a
joint federal-state welfare program. The defendant state governments claimed that Con-
gress authorized the one year waiting periods for welfare benefits which were under at-
tack, since under federal law the secretary of HEW had to approve state welfare legis-
lation. The Supreme Conrt rejected this statutory construction, denied its relevance to
the constitutionality of residency requirements, and commented, "But even if we were
to assume, arguendo, that Congress did approve the imposition of a one-year waiting
period, it is the responsive state legislation which infringes constitutional rights." Id.
Under this reasoning, any change of abortion reimbursement policy by the states which
violates protection rights would be vulnerable to attack in action against the state.
226. An action based on the equal protection clause, of course, would lie against
the state government.
227. See note 218 supra.
228. E.g., CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571 (1973); Plymouth Coal Co.
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 546 (1914); cf. Roe v. Norton, 380
F. Supp. 726, 730 (D. Conn. 1974).
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The constitutionality of the Hyde amendment may well depend on
whether the states can legally cut back on abortion services as a result of
the Hyde amendment, and advocates arguing for continued federal
funding of abortions are in an awkward and ironic position indeed.
Their case may well depend upon how persuasively they can argue that
the states would be justified in denying their clients full funding of
elective abortions when other alternative medical care for pregnancy is
fully funded.
One way they can do so is to argue that a state which loses the right
of reimbursement for the federal share of the cost of elective abirtions is
not violating the equal protection clause when it takes action to pay
providers only the state share of those costs. The state can argue
persuasively that accounting conveniences aside, it is funding these
services in the same way it did before the Hyde amendment was passed.
For equal protection purposes, the state can be viewed as paying for a
given percentage of the cost of all pregnancy services, elective abortions
included. The state, then, is engaging in no invidious discrimination.
The federal government, on the other hand, has chosen to withdraw
funding of services from pregnant women exercising their constitutional
right to choose abortion free of government interference. Such a line of
analysis would place the onus of wrongdoing on the federal government,
which is the discriminating government body in the Medicaid abortion
context.
The argument that the state government must take affirmative
action to change its laws to set up an invidious classification between
Medicaid eligibles can also be discounted as the result of a mere
accounting convenience. Surely a state could constitutionally arrange
for a system in which providers were compensated partly from general
state funds but received a separate check from a special account contain-
ing only federal reimbursement funds. The state could easily character-
ize the second part of such a payment procedure as purely "federal"
money. Under such a system, the refusal of the state to make up the
withdrawn federal share might more plausibly be consistent with the
equal protection clause.
Such an extravagant reorganization of accounting methods should
not be necessary to make apparent what already exists-a direct federal
role in funding Medicaid services. The Supreme Court should look
beyond the appearances of the reimbursement procedure and should
hold that the Hyde amendment directly injures individual Medicaid
beneficiaries and their providers.
March 1977]
If this analysis is accepted,2- 9 plaintiffs such as those in McRae can
clearly make out an equal protection claim directly against the federal
government.230  In fact, under equal protection case law, plaintiffs in
states which do not choose to reduce contributions to elective abortions
in light of the Hyde amendment may also have a cause of action against
the federal government. The Supreme Court has stated that potential
denial of equal protection is enough grounds to invalidate a statute.23"
229. It should be acknowledged that such an analysis would have potentially wide-
spread repercussions, since the number of federal-state programs has increased exponen-
tially in recent years. The suggested analysis would be available to any recipient of stat-
utory entitlements offered by state governments when the federal government encourages
the states to violate the recipient's rights. In the context of federal funding matters,
however, both the state and federal government will be immune from equal protection
attacks because the desire to save public funds ordinarily provides a rational basis for
funding cutbacks. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 491 (1970). The funding of abortions, of course, is an extremely
unusual situation because of the inclusion of abortions under the right of privacy.
230. Such an attack, of course, would be brought under the due process clause of
the fifth amendment, which includes equal protection concepts. Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
231. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-40 (1972). The Dunn case struck
down Tennessee's one year residency requirement for voting. Tennessee had argued that
no one had actually been deterred from migrating to Tennessee by the residency require-
ment and that therefore its enactment did not infringe upon the constitutional right to
travel. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, noting that whether persons were ac-
tually deterred from exercising their fundamental rights was irrelevant. According to
the Court, "the compelling-state-interest test would be triggered by 'any classification
which serves to penalize the exercise of that right .... '" Id. at 340. In the Medicaid
abortion context, Congress has clearly singled out a class of women who might choose
to have an abortion and has sought to penalize that class by withdrawing compensation
for those abortions. That a state chooses not to reduce abortion services in light of the
Hyde amendment so that no woman's right is actually infringed does not, under the
Dunn reasoning, render the Hyde amendment any less constitutional. Cf. McRae v.
Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533, 538 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
Although the Hyde amendment may be unconstitutional, the plaintiff in a state not
cutting back on abortion services may lack standing to sue under recent Supreme Court
cases requiring actual harm and a showing that the challenged conduct caused the
harm. See note 218 supra. In such a case, the state providing the undiminished abor-
tion services might have standing to challenge the Hyde amendment. It is true that a
party cannot generally base standing on the constitutional right of a third party. Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). Nor is a state a "person" under the fourteenth
amendment such that it could make its own equal protection claim. See South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). A state is harmed, however, by the Hyde amend-
ment since it is not receiving reimbursement for elective abortions. The state could ar-
gue that the secretary of HEW has no right to base its refusal to reimburse on the un-
constitutional Hyde amendment.
As to the process of judicial review of the HEW secretary's refusal to reimburse
the states for elective abortions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1316(d) (Supp. V, 1975). This section
has its own complexities, which are beyond the scope of this article. Compare id. §
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Language in Shapiro v. Thompson3 2 is helpful in challenging the
Hyde amendment. In the course of defending their residency require-
ments for welfare benefits, the states involved in Shapiro argued that
their welfare plan, including the residency requirement, had to be
approved by the secretary of HEW. Therefore, the residency require-
ments were said to be "authorized" by the federal government. The
Supreme Court rejected such a statutory construction, but went on to
add this dictum:
[I]t follows from what we have said that the provision, insofar
as it permits the one-year waiting-period provision requirement,
would be unconstitutional. Congress may not authorize the Stes
to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Perhaps Congress could
induce wider state participation in school construction if it au-
thorized the use of joint funds for the building of segregated
schools. But could it seriously be contended that Congress would
be constitutionally justified in such authorization by the need to
secure state cooperation? Congress is without power to enlist state
cooperation in a joint federal-state program by legislation which au-
thorizes the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.2 33
This language clearly militates against a determination that the Hyde
amendment is constitutional, provided the view is taken that states can
in fact reduce elective abortion services to reflect the diminution of the
federal share. Under this view, the Hyde amendment arguably "author-
izes" the states to impose a violation of the equal protection clause on
Medicaid beneficiaries. Such an authorization, according to Shapiro, is
beyond Congress' power. On the other hand, if the position is taken
that the states must provide complete funding of abortions in spite of the
Hyde amendment, the language of Shapiro might be of no avail. The
Hyde amendment cannot be said to "authorize" a violation of any
person's equal protection rights if in fact elective abortions must be
provided as before.
An entirely different problem was also posed by HEW in the
McRae case. HEW argued that if the court were to suspend the Hyde
amendment and order the appropriation of federal funds, it would be
violating article I, section 9 of the Constitution, which provides: "No
money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appro-
priations made by Law .. . ."" This contention was persuasive to
1316(a) (states have a right to review in the court of appeals), with id. § 1316(d) (right
to ask for reconsideration by the secretary of HEW but no mention of a right to review
in the court of appeals). See also 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970) (right to judicial review in
district court unless "statutes preclude judicial review").
232. 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
233. Id. at 641.
234. 421 F. Supp. at 540-41.
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Judge Biunno in Doe v. Mathews,235 but Judge Dooling found it to be
no impediment to issuing an injunction. Congress was the institution
which had appropriated the money, according to Judge Dooling. The
court was doing no more than enjoining the effect of an illegal restriction
on that appropriation. Thus, "[p]ayment of the funds will follow, but
not by an act equivalent to appropriation. 230
Judge Dooling also rejected claims by HEW that the Hyde amend-
ment was not a denial of federal funds to force Medicaid patients into
carrying their pregnancies to term but rather was a method of encourag-
ing alternative methods of family planning. The Hyde amendment, he
said, could not be validated "by putting it in juxtaposition with the
federal encouragement of family planning. 237  The Hyde amendment
was thus seen as "a retributive act, not a simple non-invidious decision
not to provide a type of medical assistance." '238
On this basis, the Hyde amendment was distinguished from a
congressional decision to exclude coverage of longterm inpatient care for
the mentally ill. Such a decision was a "reasoned legislative decision
• . . free of invidious discrimination .... .. 2 The Hyde amendment,
on the other hand, was the same kind of invidious denial of reimburse-
ment held unconstitutional in numerous federal district court decisions.
It infringed on the constitutional right of women on Medicaid to choose
abortion over child bearing. Absent a compelling reason for its actions,
the government could not refuse to expend monies from its 1977 HEW
appropriation on elective abortions.
235. 420 F. Supp. 865, 870-72 (D.N.J. 1976).
236. 421 F. Supp. at 540. The court cited United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303
(1946). 421 F. Supp. at 541. In Lovett, Congress had attached a rider to an appro-
priations bill requiring that none of the funds in that bill could be used to pay the sala-
ries of three federal employees suspected of being "subversives." The rider was inval-
idated as an unconstitutional bill of attainder. The Supreme Court did not find article
I, section 9, an obstacle in declaring the rider unconstitutional, thereby releasing funds
to pay the salaries of the three employees. See also Steinberg v. United States, 163
F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
237. 421 F. Supp. at 541. Congressional debates on the Hyde amendment clearly
indicate that it was designed simply to prohibit abortions. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REc.
H 6648 (daily ed. June 24, 1976) (remarks of Representative Bauman); 122 CONG.
REC. H 8634 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1976) (remarks of Representative Hyde); 122 CONG.
REC. S 14562-63 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1976) (remarks of Senator Helms). The desire to
foster family planning was never discussed. See generally 122 CONG. REc. H 8631-41
(daily ed. Aug. 10, 1976); 122 CONG. REC. S 14561-70 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1976); cf.
Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1401-02 (1st Cir., 1970), aii'd, 405 U.S. 438 (1971).
But see H.R. REP. No. 94-1555, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
238. 421 F. Supp. at 541.
239. Id; see Legion v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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Conclusion
It must be conceded that abortion advocates for Medicaid benefi-
ciaries are forced by the Hyde amendment to argue at cross purposes.
On one hand, a woman desiring to obtain an abortion under the
Medicaid program and depending upon legal action to get it must
proceed against the state government, since it is the state government
that will reimburse her provider of services. Therefore, her advocate
will want to marshal all the arguments as to why the Constitution, Title
XIX, HEW regulations, and state law compel the state to provide
elective abortion services among the medical benefits made available to
eligible pregnant women. The advocate will, of course, be loath to
accept arguments that the Hyde amendment changes any of the law that
had previously bound the states. The Hyde amendment, after all, is a
restriction on a 1977 appropriations bill and affects nothing beyond the
allocation of expenses between the state and federal governments.
On the other hand, advocates wishing to challenge the constitution-
ality of the Hyde amendment cannot admit that the states are prevented
from withholding elective abortion srvices from Medicaid beneficiaries,
since such an admission would be fatal to their challenge. Advocates
must show that the Hyde amendment injures their clients directly by
disrupting the delivery of elective abortions.
Between the two, the maintenance of laws binding the states is no
doubt more important. The Hyde amendment will, of course, disappear
within six months unless a similar rider is placed on next year's appro-
priation. Also, the current law pertaining to the states is very effective
in guaranteeing to women on Medicaid the right to choose between
abortion and childbearing. These issues will soon be resolved by the
Supreme Court. A definitive statement from the Court will lay to rest
many of the perplexing legal problems raised in the course of this
article.
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